







In recent years probabilistic knowledge-based systems such as Bayesian net¬
works and influence diagrams have come to the fore as a means of represent¬
ing and reasoning about complex real-world situations. Although some of the
probabilities used in these models may be obtained statistically, where this is
impossible or simply inconvenient, modellers rely on expert knowledge. Ex¬
perts, however, typically find it difficult to specify exact probabilities and con¬
ventional representations cannot reflect any uncertainty they may have. In
this way, the use of conventional point probabilities can damage the accuracy,
robustness and interpretability of acquired models. With these concerns in
mind, psychometric researchers have demonstrated that fuzzy numbers are
good candidates for representing the inherent vagueness of probability esti¬
mates, and the fuzzy community has responded with two distinct theories of
fuzzy probabilities.
This thesis, however, identifies formal and presentational problems with these
theories which render them unable to represent even very simple scenarios.
This analysis leads to the development of a novel and intuitively appealing
alternative - a theory of linguistic probabilities patterned after the standard Kol-
mogorov axioms of probability theory. Since fuzzy numbers lack algebraic
inverses, the resulting theory is weaker than, but generalises its classical coun¬
terpart. Nevertheless, it is demonstrated that analogues for classical proba¬
bilistic concepts such as conditional probability and random variables can be
constructed. In the classical theory, representation theorems mean that most of
the time the distinction between mass/density distributions and probability
measures can be ignored. Similar results are proven for linguistic probabili-
i
ties.
From these results it is shown that directed acyclic graphs annotated with lin¬
guistic probabilities (under certain identified conditions) represent systems of
linguistic random variables. It is then demonstrated these linguistic Bayesian
networks can utilise adapted best-of-breed Bayesian network algorithms (junc¬
tion tree based inference and Bayes' ball irrelevancy calculation). These algo¬
rithms are implemented in ARBOR, an interactive design, editing and querying
tool for linguistic Bayesian networks.
To explore the applications of these techniques, a realistic example drawn from
the domain of forensic statistics is developed. In this domain the knowledge
engineering problems cited above are especially pronounced and expert esti¬
mates are commonplace. Moreover, robust conclusions are of unusually crit¬
ical importance. An analysis of the resulting linguistic Bayesian network for
assessing evidential support in glass-transfer scenarios highlights the potential
utility of the approach.
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The research documented in this thesis represents an attempt to answer a set of
linked questions about the mathematical and computational aspects of mod¬
elling probabilities as fuzzy quantities. The motivations for this study are
sketched in the following section. This feeds into the set of specific research
questions that follows. The chapter closes with an outline of the remainder of
the thesis.
1.1 Motivation
Many different types of uncertainty can be found in the sorts of information in¬
telligent systems must process and it is not uncommon to find several of these
represented in a single item. So, for example, in constructing a knowledge-
based system for industrial fault diagnosis, an expert might supply that if the
water pressure is well above tolerance levels, then it is extremely likely that
1
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the output valve will fail. Here, the meaning of the term "extremely likely"
combines elements of both fuzzy and probabilistic uncertainty.
The use of fuzzy sets to model every-day descriptions such as "John is tall" is
no doubt familiar. The idea behind the set of theories sharing the name "fuzzy
probability" is that imprecise linguistic characterisations of probabilistic un¬
certainty can be treated in an analogous way. The goal then, put simply, is to
develop a principled approach to statements such as
It is quite likely to rain tomorrow. (1.1)
A possible objection at this stage is that (1.1) is hopelessly uninformative. If
(probabilistic) information about the next day's weather is crucial to a system's
successful operation there are surely better ways to obtain it. In short, why
bother attempting to utilise such woefully low-grade information? The an¬
swer, of course, is the standard argument for "computing with words" (Zadeh,
1996): whilst gold-standard numerical information may be available about to¬
morrow's weather, there are probabilistic assessments which are too difficult,
expensive or simply impossible to obtain with such precision.
For example, consider the questions: Will there be artificial intelligence in 10
years? 100 years? 1000 years? Consultation with an expert is unlikely to yield
much beyond vague probabilistic statements like "It is extremely unlikely that
we will have (true) artificial intelligence in ten years time." But if such in¬
formation is to be used within the framework of classical probability theory,
numerical estimates of the probabilities of interest are required.
In such cases and indeed many that are less speculative, the difficulty of ob¬
taining point estimates of probability has been widely reported (Kahneman
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et al., 1985; Zimmer, 1983). Whilst an expert may be willing to assert that it is
extremely likely that there will be intelligent constructs this time next millen¬
nium it would seem odd, a loss of academic integrity even, to state that the
probability of that occurrence is 0.93. Indeed, a committee of the U.S. National
Research Council (National Research Council Governing Board Commitee on
the Assessment of Risk, 1981;Wallsten et al., 1986) has written that there is "an
important responsibility not to use numbers, which convey the impression of
precision, when the understanding of relationships is indeed less secure. Thus
whilst quantitative risk assessment facilitates comparison, such comparison
may be illusory or misleading if the use of precise numbers is unjustified."
Subjective probability assessments are often the product of countless barely
articulate intuitions and are often best expressed in words. It is misleading to
seek to express them with numerical precision.
1.2 The case for fuzzy probabilities
Responding to these difficulties, researchers have attempted to obtain point
values for probabilistic terms experimentally. The general form of these inves¬
tigations is to present subjects with probabilistic terms requesting a numeri¬
cal translation. It is hardly surprising that studies such as Budescu and Wall¬
sten (1985) have concluded that point estimates of probability terms vary too
greatly between subjects and exhibit too great an overlap to be useful for many
problems.
Attempts to model probabilistic terms using fuzzy sets, however, have proven
more successful. For example, a relatively sophisticated experimental method
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for eliciting fuzzy models of probabilistic terms has been developed by Wall-
sten et al. (1986) and the inter-subjective stability of generated terms has been
examined with promising results. In addition, Zimmer (1986) has reported
that verbal expressions of probabilistic uncertainty were "more accurate" than
numerical values in estimating the frequency of multiple attributes by exper¬
imental studies. Whilst there are outstanding problems such as context sensi¬
tivity with the fuzzy approach to modelling probabilistic terms, these psycho¬
metric studies are unanimous in preferring it to numerical estimates.
1.3 Problem statement
The research presented in this thesis represents an attempt to answer the ques¬
tion: what form should a theory of fuzzy probabilities take?
It does not seek to offer a view on the philosophical aspects, viability or utility
of representing vague concepts in general using fuzzy sets, nor on the applica¬
tion of fuzzy arithmetic in particular to modelling vague probabilities. Instead
it is hoped that the reader will evaluate the present work in the light of the
psychometric studies outlined above, and on the assumption that these are
sensible and useful things to do.
This is not, then, an experimental study - although suggestions for support¬
ing experiments will be made from time to time. Instead it has the form of
a systematic exploration of the mathematical, computational and aspects of a
particular combination of probability theory and fuzzy logic.
This perhaps complicates evaluation. Artificial Intelligence - understood as
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the attempt to coax machines into exhibiting intelligent behaviour - is funda¬
mentally an experimental discipline. Nevertheless, there is a long tradition
of more analytic work in AI that proposes an abstract theory developed for
a set of identified reasons and where the immanent experimental programme
is assumed or deferred. Indeed, Zadeh's initial forays into fuzzy logic which
provide significant inspiration for the present study, have this character.
The test of quality for such work must be whether the concepts and methods
(and their computational counterparts of representations and algorithms) that
are introduced are sufficiently novel, coherent, interesting and potentially use¬
ful. The critique of existing work demonstrates that the theory of linguistic
probabilities is novel and non-trivial - others have walked a similar path but
have stumbled on it.
Similarly, it is hoped, the coherence and richness of the theory should be evi¬
dent from the relative ease with which sophisticated concepts such as random
variables and conditional probability can be adapted. Finally, the potential
utility is suggested by the development of linguistic probability networks as a
scheme for representing and reasoning about multivariate linguistic probabil¬
ity distributions and their application to a realistic case study.
1.4 Overview
The chapter following this brief introduction presents a summary of the key
concepts and notation that constitute the technical background of the present
work. Although much of the material here will be familiar to the reader the
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notation and manner of presentation are significant: some of the notation, par¬
ticularly that associated with fuzzy numbers and their arithmetic, where there
are not yet universally accepted conventions, has been invented or adapted
for the present purposes; and the way in which classical probability theory
is introduced intended to prefigure the sequence and structure of the theory
developed here.
Chapter 3 examines a number of related pieces of research which also seek
to hybridize fuzzy logic and probability theory. Because of the breadth and
somewhat inter-disciplinary nature of this area of research there have been
few systematic reviews. Chapter 3 attempts to address this deficit. Most of the
text, however, is given over to a discussion and original critique of what are
identified as the two existing theories of "fuzzy probabilities".
In response to these criticisms, Chapter 4 develops the core theory of linguistic
probabilities. Unlike its two predecessors in interest, the theory is explicitly
patterned after the standard measure-theoretic axioms of contemporary prob¬
ability theory. It is shown that linguistic probability measures, like their clas¬
sical counterparts, are monotonic and continuous. Analogues for the classical
concepts of conditional probability, independence and discrete and continuous
random variables are also introduced and discussed.
Chapter 5 develops the theory into a computational application by examining
how linguistic probabilities could be used in a Bayesian-network-like graphi¬
cal knowledge representation. It is shown that the resulting representation is
consistent, if not (in a certain sense, to be defined) complete.
Classical Bayesian networks are increasingly used to assess the strength of ev-
Chapter 1. Introduction 7
idential support provided by forensic evidence. Chapter 6, introduces this ap¬
plication area and then, through a detailed case study, shows how linguistic
Bayesian networks might be used to address some deficiencies in the current
approach.
Finally, chapter 7 draws matters to a close. The chief claims and achievements




This chapter introduces and discusses the basic mathematical concepts that
underlie the remainder of the work. Naturally, it is anticipated that some of
the technical material will be familiar to the reader. In these cases, however
a brief rehearsal serves both to introduce the requisite notation, and where
there may be several alternatives in the literature, to clarify precisely which
definitions are in operation.
The chapter is divided into three main sections. First the basic principles of
fuzzy logic and fuzzy set theory are introduced against a background of clas¬
sical and non-standard logic. These elementary fuzzy concepts are then used
to define the concept of a fuzzy number, the chosen model for fuzzy probabil¬
ities. Some auxiliary results regarding the (natural) algebra and topology of
fuzzy numbers are presented which are central to the development of linguis¬
tic probability theory.
The second section presents a brief overview of the standard Kolmogorov ax-
8
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iomatization of (classical) probability theory and sets the familiar entities of
probability theory in particular conditional probability and random variables
into this context.
The third and final section presents a brief overview of the theoretical under¬
pinnings of (classical) Bayesian networks. The structure of these section last
two sections is mirrored by chapters 4 and 5 respectively which seek to emu¬
late the constructions they present in the revised axiomatization.
2.1 Fuzzy logic
One key section of Aristotle's Metaphysics, a work that has profoundly influ¬
enced the modern (realist) concept of truth, formal logic and linguistic philos¬
ophy, states that "... the understanding either affirms or denies every object of
understanding or thought... whenever it is right or wrong. When, in asserting
or denying, it combines the predicates in one way, it is right; when in the other,
it is wrong."
Interpretative difficulties aside, this short excerpt illustrates two key features
of Aristotle's thought. First, all statements are (understood as) either true or
false. Second, this understanding is either correct or incorrect in virtue of
the world. Setting aside the metaphysical/epistemological aspects this can
be glossed as
Every statement is either true or false. (2.1)
In contemporary philosophy of logic this has become known as the Principle
of Bivalence.
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The principle is meta-logical in that it cannot be formulated within logic itself.
However two formulations are available within logic namely the law of non¬
contradiction
h-WA-W (2.2)
and the law of the excluded middle (or tertium non datur)
|= 4> V —>(() (2.3)
These differ from 2.1 in that they do not necessarily assert that P has a truth
value.
In classical logic these two laws hold and it is therefore usually said to sat¬
isfy 2.1. But this has been the subject of controversy. So, for example, from a
philosophical point of view it is not clear that a prospective statement, such
as "Mary will go to the shops tomorrow" has (at this moment) any definite
truth value. A similar difficulty is presented by intensional contexts. So, for
example, one may believe "either John is having an affair or John is not having
an affair" without believing either disjunct separately. Such modal statements
have suggested to some researchers that 2.1 may be rejected while 2.3 and 2.2
are retained.
An opposite area of difficulty is highlighted by intuitionistic (constructive)
logic, which equates truth and provenness. Godel's Theorem (Godel, 1931)
demonstrates that for any sufficiently strong, consistent axiomatic system, there
is a simple mathematical statement, G, that is true, but neither provable nor
refutable. Thus intuitionistic logic rejects 2.3, because G V ->G can only be
proven by the (impossible) proof or refutation of G. Interestingly, however,
2.2 is retained as a trivial consequence of the semantics of negation, namely
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that -<P can only be derived from a proof that P leads to a contradiction, but in
the case of 2.2, the P in question is itself the very definition of a contradiction!
Another strand in the philosophy of logic has been to reject 2.1 by the addi¬
tion of one or more intermediate truth values. So, for example, in order to
address epistemic concerns one might add an "undecided" truth value. The
classical truth functional operators are then extended to encompass this new
value. Very many different trivalent logics have been proposed, prompting
the MathWorld encyclopaedia to remark (with jocular precision) that "there
are 3072 such logics". Nevertheless, such distinguished philosophers such as
Emile Post and Charles Peirce may be numbered amongst this authors of this
vast body of research.
Nowadays, trivalent logics are viewed as just a particular class amongstmany
multi-valued logics. Much pioneering work in this area was undertaken by
the Polish mathematician and philosopher, Jan Lukasiewicz and however this
work largely remained within a logicomathematical niche until, in the mid
1960s Lotfi Zadeh proposed a systematic study of what he termed "fuzzy
logic" as a means to model the vagueness of natural language.
2.1.1 Fuzzy logic in Al
Zadeh was extremely successful in demonstrating the practical utility of the
fuzzy approaches to knowledge representation and (equally important) in per¬
suading other researchers to back the programme of work he outlined.
Control techniques utilising meaningful natural language rule sets to implic-
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itly generate sophisticated control surfaces were an early and continuing area
of success. Unusually for an Artificial Intelligence technique, fuzzy logic saw
rapid adoption outside academia and a host of commercial and domestic ap¬
plications.
Nevertheless, Zadeh has, from the outset, maintained that the fuzzy approach
is a generic knowledge representation strategy and that "fuzzification" is a
process which can be applied to any mathematical theory. This idea has been
taken up with gusto by a host of researchers and has resulted in awide-ranging
but systematic effort to fuzzify various areas ofmathematics. The fruit of these
labours is reflected in Section 2.1.4 and following.
2.1.2 Fuzzy sets
This section introduces the basic formal concepts and notation associated with
fuzzy sets.
Definition 2.1.1 (Fuzzy set). Given a universe of discourse, D, a fuzzy set, A, in
D is determined by its membership function
Pa'- d [0,1] (2.4)
For any d E D, id) is termed d's degree ofmembership in A.
The force of this definition is that two fuzzy sets are equal if they have the same
membership function. An alternative representation of fuzzy sets is through
their alphacuts. If a fuzzy set is thought of as a landscape (in a three dimen¬
sional Venn diagram) then its alphacuts correspond to its contours.
Definition 2.1.2 (Alphacut). Given a fuzzy set, A, the alphacut of A at a G [0,1]
Chapter 2. Background
is the set of elements with membership degree at least a i.e.
= {x G D : pa(x)> a}
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(2.5)
That alphacuts andmembership functions are equivalent andmutually-determining
representations is a trivial consequence of their definitions.
Theorem 2.1.3 (Decomposition). Given fuzzy sets A and B with universe of dis¬
course D,A = B ifand only ifA[a = B[afor all a G [0,1]
Proof If pa = Pb then for all a G [0,1]
A[a = {xeD : pA(x) > a} = {x G D : pB{x) > a} = B[a (2.6)
Now suppose A[a = B[a for all a G [0,1]. If p.A(d) < ps^d) for some d G D then
d G B^h(dy but d f A^B(dj, which is a contradiction. By symmetry, pa—Bb- □
2.1.3 Triangular norms
Triangular norms were introduced by Schwiezer and Sklar (1963) as a model
of distances in probabilistic spaces. In fuzzy logic they are analogues for the
Boolean "and" truth functor.
Definition 2.1.4 (Triangular norm). A mapping T : [0, l]2 —> [0,1] is a triangular
norm if it satisfies the following properties,
a) (Symmetry) for all jc,y G [0,1], T(x,y) = T(y,x)
b) (Associativity) for all x,y,z G [0,1], T(x, T(y,z)) = T(T(x,y),z)
c) (Monotonicity) if x<x',y <y',T(x,y) < Tfx1,/)
d) (Identity) for all x G [0,1], T(x, 1) = x
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Triangular norms are frequently termed "t-norms".
T-norms generalise the Boolean "and" operation. The Boolean "or" operation
is generalised by t-conorms.
Definition 2.1.5 (Triangular co-norm). A mapping S : [0, l]2 —> [0,1] is a trian¬
gular co-norm if and only if
T(x,y) = 1 —5(1 —x, 1 —y) (2.7)
is a triangular norm. Triangular co-norms are frequently termed "s-norms".
There are an infinite number of t- and s-norm pairs. Some examples are pre¬
sented in Table 2.1. The choice of t-norm is a somewhat vexed issue. For practi¬
cal applications one approach has been to treat the selection of truth-functional
operator as an optimization problem in its own right. For example, Song et al.
(2003) describe a parameterised family of operators and a learning algorithm
for choosing the optimal parameter given a set of training data.
Historically, min and max were Zadeh's choice of truth functors and these re¬
main, for the author at least, the most intuitively appealing. In addition gen¬
eralised t-norm notation is rather cumbersome. Finally, min and max (and
their infinitistic counterparts inf and sup) are uniquely well-suited to the de¬
velopment of fuzzy sets of numbers as they generalise immediately to arbi¬
trary numbers of operands. For these reasons, the remainder of this text will
utilise them as concrete truth-functional operators, but the reader should bear
in mind that most of what follows hold regardless of the choice of t-norm.
t-norm
s-norm
Zadeh tukasicwixz Product/probabilistic Weak
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2.1.4 The Extension Principle
As indicated earlier, Zadeh has conceived of fuzzy theory not as a single theory
per se, but rather as a process of "fuzzification" - a method for generalizing
any specific representation scheme or theory from crisp (roughly speaking,
first-order predicate logic) to fuzzy. One of the central results that supports this
contention is the Extension Principle. This identifies a natural way to extend
maps between classical sets to maps on fuzzy sets defined over them (as a
universe of discourse).
Definition 2.1.6 (Extension Principle). Given a map,
/: A\ XA2 x ... xAn —>B (2.8)
the natural fuzzy extension, /, is the map determined by:
^f{ax,a2,...,an)(y) = SUP T(*1 ),Pa2(x2),.. .pan (*„)) (2-9)
f(xi,x2,...,xn)=y
for all fuzzy sets a\,a2,...,an defined on A\,A2, ■■ ■,An respectively. / is some¬
times referred to as the sup-t convolution of /.
In other words, the possibility of a particular element being in the image of a
fuzzy set under an extended function is simply the possibility of the disjunc¬
tion of each element that maps to it belonging to that set.
A theorem first presented by Nguyen (1978) for classical fuzzy truth operators
and extended to arbitrary sup t-norm convolutions by Fuller and Keresztfalvi
(1990) connects alpha cuts and extended functions. In plain language it states
that the alphacuts of the image of a fuzzy set (under an extended operator) are
just the images of the alphacuts of that set.
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Theorem 2.1.7. Given a map f: X —> Y and a fuzzy set, A with universe ofdiscourse
X then for all a e [0,1],
/(A)La = {/(•*) -xeA[a} (2.10)
Proof The proof follows immediately from the definitions. For all y € Y,
ye/(A)La sup pA(a) > a (2.11)
f{a)=y
<=> 3a' G A with f(a') = y such that Pa{ci ) > a (2.12)
yt{f(x) ■ x ^ A [«} (2.13)
□
This result has also been extended to arbitrary L-fuzzy systems by Bertoluzza
and Bodini (1998).
2.2 Fuzzy numbers
Fuzzy numbers are simply fuzzy sets of real numbers whose membership
functions have the "right sort" of properties. Although the precise conditions
remain the subject of some debate, for example, it is sometimes required that
the membership function be "unimodal". Alternatively the convexity condi¬
tionmay be removed, the following definition is by far the most commonplace:
Definition 2.2.1 (Fuzzy number). A fuzzy number, a, is a fuzzy set of real
numbers with the following properties
a) ya is normal, i.e. there is jc G R such that pa{x) = 1
b) Pa is convex, i.e. forall^:,y,zGRifx<y<zthenJaa(y) >mm(jia(x),pa(z))
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Real numbers
Figure 2.1: Examples of fuzzy numbers
c) jua is upper semi-continuous, i.e. for all a G [0,1] {jc G R : pa(x) < cx}
is open
d) the support of a, ajo, is bounded.
Note that this definition also covers what might be termed "fuzzy intervals".
Examples of fuzzy numbers can be found in Figure 2.1. The set of all fuzzy
numbers are termed the "fuzzy numbers" and denoted, R^.
Because the weak alphacut at zero of a fuzzy number is always the entire real
line, it is notationally convenient to consider instead its level sets.
Definition 2.2.2 (Level set). Given a G R^ and a G [0,1] define the a level set
of a as
{a\a oc G (0,1]1 (2.14)C1({JC G R : ^(jc) > 0}) a = 0
where C1(X) is the closure (in R) of X C R.
An immediate and attractive consequence of these definitions is the following
theorem.
Theorem 2.2.3. The level sets ofa fuzzy number are intervals of theform [x ,y]-
Proof Since the support of a is bounded each La(a) is bounded. Letx = inf(La(a))
and y = sup(La(a)). Clearly, La(a) C [jc,y]. By upper semi-continuity x,y G La(a)
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and hence by convexity, [x,y] C La(a). □
It will occasionally be useful to refer to the upper and lower bounds of these
alphacut intervals. For these quantities the following notation is adopted,
LAja = inf(Alct) (2.15)
[A] a = sup(Ala) (2.16)
There is a natural embedding of the real numbers and their closed intervals
into R^. This will be denoted by a x subscript. So, for example, the member¬
ship function of \x (the embedding of 1) is simply the characteristic function
{1 if jc = 1 (2.17)0 otherwise
A similar notation will be adopted for embedded intervals. So, for example,
{1 if jc e [0,1] (2.18)0 otherwise
Lemma 2.2.4. Ifax = a'x then a = a'. Similarly if[a,b\x — [a',b']x then [a,b\ = [a',b'}.
Proof. These results follow immediately from the definitions. □
2.2.1 Arithmetic operators
The Extension Principle may also be used to define fuzzy counterparts to the
standard arithmetic operators of addition, multiplication, subtraction and di-
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vision. If the standard arithmetic operators are considered as (continuous)
maps from R2 —► R the straightforward application of the principle yields the
following definitions for the extended operators. As is conventional, the exten¬
sion of a real arithmetic operator will be denoted by circling its usual symbol.
In the context of the fuzzy numbers it is also possible to derive these opera¬
tors by examining the effects of performing interval-based calculations at each
alphacut.
Definition 2.2.5 (Fuzzy-arithmetic operators). For all a,b e R^ the extended
operators ©, <g>, 0,0 are determined by
f*a®b(z)= sup min(jia(x),/ib(y)) (2-19)
x+y=z
Pa®b{z) = sup min(fia(x),fib(y)) (2.20)
xy—z
faeb(z)= sup minQia(x),fib(y)) (2.21)
x—y—z




For real numbers, a,b,a<b if and only if a = min(a, b). Following this observa¬
tion, the Extension Principle may be used to induce a natural partial ordering,
4, on the fuzzy numbers
a 4 b •<==>■ a = min(a,&) (2.23)
Pa{z) — sup m\n(pa(x),fib(y)) Vz G R (2.24)
min(x,y)=z
This ordering extends the standard (total) ordering of the reals in the sense that
agrees with the standard ordering on the set embedded reals.
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Since the set of fuzzy numbers whose membership functions are zero outside
some given real interval [a,b\ can be characterised as
It is therefore natural to denote such an interval of fuzzy numbers by [ax, bx\.
Another partial order on the fuzzy numbers is generated by the fuzzy subset
relation.
Definition 2.2.6 (Subsumption). Given a,b G R^ b is said to subsume a (written
a C b) if and only if for all reft,
One number subsumes another if, loosely speaking, it is a less precise version
of it. Subsumption has some useful properties under the fuzzy arithmetic op¬
erators which will be discussed in a following section.
A key property of the subsumption ordering, that has not been widely ob¬
served, is that it "carries over" extended operators in the sense of the following
Lemma.
Lemma2.2.7. Given an operator * : R" —> Randfuzzy numbers, a\,a2,... an,bi,b2, ■
bn such that a,- C bi for all 1 <i<n then
{x £ R-^ : ax =4 xAx =<; bx} (2.25)
ftW <hb(x) (2.26)
®(a\,a2...an) C ®(bi,b2-■-bn) (2.27)
Chapter 2. Background 22
Proof. By the Extension Principle
®(ai,d2...an)(x) = sup { min afxi)} (2.28)
x=*(xi,X2...xn)




This result allows complex calculations (such as the Bayesian sum of products
expression for joint probability distribution considered later) to be rearranged
and computed from partial results just as in the classical case.
2.2.3 Functions
Extending a real operator (i.e. amapping from R" to reals) does not necessarily
yield a fuzzy real operator. However if the operator maps closed intervals to
closed intervals, then its extension will map fuzzy reals to fuzzy reals. All con¬
tinuous functions have this property. Furthermore if the function is injective
(or, equivalently, monotonic) then whenever
Lemma 2.2.8. Iff : R —> R is continuous then the map f: R^ —■> R^ determined by
hf(a) (y) = sup(/^M ; y = f(x)} (2.30)
is well-defined.
Proof. By Theorem 2.1.7 and 2.2.3 it suffices to consider the level sets. By
the Extreme Value Theorem, since / is continuous the image of level sets (i.e.
closed intervals) are also closed intervals. Thus / is well-defined. □
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2.2.4 Algebraic properties
With the exception of 0, the basic arithmetical operators described above are
closed with respect to the fuzzy numbers. As with their classical analogues,
fuzzy addition and multiplication are commutative and associative with iden¬
tities 0X and 1% respectively. There are however, some important differences
between classical and fuzzy arithmetic. First, fuzzy numbers are not distribu¬
tive in the classical sense. Instead they are subdistributive i.e. for all a,b,c G 1R/,
a 0 {b © c) C (a 0 b) © (a 0 c) (2.31)
It is important to note however, that where the fuzzy numbers involved are
strictly positive (or negative) full distributivity is retained.
Second, in general, fuzzy numbers have neither additive nor multiplicative
inverses, although there are (non-unique) pseudo-inverses. In particular, for
alia G R^, 0X C a©(O%0a) and with the usual cautions about 0, \x C a0{\x0a).
In short, R^ equipped with ©, 0 and their respective identities 0X, \x is a sub-
distributive, commutative semi-ring.
2.2.5 Solving fuzzy equations
The lack of true multiplicative and additive inverses presents a problem for
solving systems of fuzzy arithmetical equations. In classical linear algebra so¬
lutions are found by "doing the same" to both sides of an equation. To take
a trivial example, consider solving y = jc + 3 for x In Peano arithmetic, the
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(additive) inverse of 3 is added to both sides yielding
y+ (—3) =x+ 3 + (—3) = x -t- 0 = x (2.32)
In fuzzy arithmetic, however, since the constant term ("3" above) might not
have an inverse this simple strategy fails and indeed the equation might not
have a solution (depending, roughly speaking, on the value of y).
However it is possible to obtain traction under various conditions.
Lemma 2.2.9. Iff is a continuous, monotonic function then its fuzzy extension f has
the property that for all a,b G R^
f(a) C f(b) <t=> aCb (2.33)
Proof By Lemma 2.2.8 / is well-defined. Since / is both continuous and mono-
tonic, it is injective at each level set and so by Theorem 2.1.7 the desired result
is obtained. □
2.2.6 Topology
This section presents the standard metric, on the space of fuzzy numbers
which is essential in providing substance to the to the infinite sums required
for the development of probability theory.
The metric, gL, is derived from the standard Hausdorff metric.
Definition 2.2.10 (Hausdorff metric). Given a metric space (X,d) let Fx be the
set of all closed, bounded subsets of X. Given A £ Fx and r > 0 let Nr(A,r)
denote the neighbourhood of A with radius r i.e. (JxeAB{x,r). The Hausdorff
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metric is given by
dn(A,B) = inf{r > 0 : A C Nr(B,r) AB C Nr{A,r)} (2.34)
If a metric space is complete (i.e. every Cauchy sequence has a limit in that
space) then the induced Hausdorff metric space inherits this property.
Theorem 2.2.11. Hausdorffmetric spaces inherit completeness
If (X,d) is a complete metric space, then the Hausdorff metric induced by d is also
complete.
Proof. Suppose (A„) is a Cauchy sequencewith respect to the Hausdorffmetric.
By selecting a sub-sequence if necessary, we may assume that An and An+i are
within 2~n of each other, that is, that An C Nr(An+i, 2~n) and An+\ C Nr(An, 2~n).
Now for any natural number N, there is a sequence (dn)n>N in X such that
xn G An and d(xn,xn+\) < 2~n. Any such sequence is Cauchy with respect to d
and thus converges to some jc G X. Now, by applying the triangle inequality,
for any n> N, d(xn,x) < 2-n+1.
Define A to be the set of all x such that x is the limit of a sequence (xn)n>o with
n G An and d (xn, xn+ \) < 2~n. Then A is nonempty.
Furthermore, for any n, if x G A, then there is some xn G An such that d(xn ,x) <
2~n+1, and so A C Nr(An,2~n+1). Consequently, the set A is nonempty, closed
and bounded.
Now, suppose e > 0. Thus e > 2~N > 0 for some N. Let n > N+ 1. Then by
applying the claim in the first paragraph, for any xn G An, there is some x G
X with d(xn,x) < 2~n+i. Hence An C Nr(A,2~n+1). Hence the sequence (A„)
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converges to A in the Hausdorff metric. □
In this way it is possible to produce a complete metric space over the set of
closed bounded intervals of R. Recalling that the level sets of a fuzzy number
are such closed bounded intervals this in turn can be extended to the fuzzy
numbers. Note that whilst various other Hausdorff-like metrics have been
proposed for fuzzy sets in general, these have quite serious problems (Brass,
2002).
Definition 2.2.12 (Extended Hausdorff metric doc). The extended Hausdorff
metric, doo: R^ x R^ —> R is determined by
Under this metric the distance between embedded real numbers is simply the
standard Euclidean distance, in the sense of the following Lemma.
Lemma 2.2.13. Ifa, b e R then doo(a^,bf) = \a — b\.





It is well-known that (R^,do°) is a complete metric space.
Theorem 2.2.14. (R^cL) is a complete metric space.
Proof. Suppose R^ is a Cauchy sequence then at each alphacut there
is a Cauchy sequence with respect to dn- By completeness there is a limit in¬
terval associated with that alpha. □
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2.2.7 Convergence results
With this metric in place it is possible to define the convergence of sequences
and sums in the usual manner.
Definition 2.2.15 (Convergence of fuzzy numbers). A sequence a\,a,2,...E 1R^
is said to converge to a e R^ if for all e > 0 there is N such that for all n > N
do*{an,a)<£ (2.36)
Such a convergent sequence and its limit will be denoted an —* a.
Definition 2.2.16 (Convergent series). Given a sequence a\,a,2,... £ R^, con¬
sider the sequence of partial sums bn = Yl}= \ ai- ^ bn is a convergent sequence
then an is said to be a convergent series with limit
Lemma 2.2.17. Ifan—* a e R then (an)x —> ax G R^.
Proof. By Lemma 2.2.13 for all n, doo((an)z, ax) = \an — a\. Now, given e > 0, since
an is a convergent sequence, there exists an N such that
d°°((an)x,ax) = \an — a\ < e (2.37)
for all n>N. □
2.2.8 Computational issues
It has often been observed that commonly used classes of fuzzy number are not
closed under the standard arithmetic operators. So, for example, the product of
two polygonal fuzzy numbers is not polygonal. This has lead some to conclude
that it is not possible to have a correct (i.e. accurate) and computationally
tractable calculus of fuzzy numbers.
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If however, fuzzy numbers are represented by a pair of finite series of finite
polynomial shoulder functions determining the upper and lower boundaries
of their alphacuts, then their arithmetic combinations also fall into this class
and can be computed exactly with relative ease. As a simple example, consider
the fuzzy number, a, determined by the membership function,
if x G [0,1]
Pa(x)=* 2 —jc if jc e (1,2]
0 otherwise




Now, a® a has a membership function which can be obtained through solving
quadratic equations and paying careful attention to boundaries
y/x if x e [0,1]
Pa®a(x) = 2 — y/x if X £ (1,4] (2.40)
0 otherwise
But this is hardly easy to represent and performing further computations with
it will be increasingly complicated. On the other hand, the alphacut represen¬
tation is trivially calculated as
{a ® a) Lot — [a2, a2 — 4a + 4] (2.41)
Further computations can be performed with similar ease. Naturally, "zero-
crossing" fuzzy numbers (numbers whose membership at 0 is non-zero) re¬
quire some caution and introduce precision errors (as it becomes necessary to
"split" the polynomials at their roots).
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2.3 Probability theory
This section constitutes a brisk introduction to the formal underpinnings of
contemporary probability theory.
2.3.1 Fuzziness and probability
Both fuzzy logic and probability theory are considered theories of uncertainty,
however they deal with very different types of uncertainty and in very differ¬
ent ways. Where fuzzy logic represents an attempt to model the uncertainty
arising from the vagueness of everyday concepts, probability theory models
uncertainty about what has happened (or will happen).
Unlike fuzzy logic, classical probability assumes that any proposition is either
absolutely true or absolutely false, it's just that one might not be certain which.
So, an apple drawn at random from a bag must be either red or not red and
certainly not (as a fuzzy account might have it) a little of each.
Another key difference between the two is that fuzzy logic is truth functional:
the truth value of a compound proposition is fully determined by the truth
values of its constituents. So, the truth value of a conjunction is conventionally
the minimum of the truth values of the conjuncts. This differs radically from
probability theory where the probability of a conjunction is not determined
by the probabilities of the conjuncts unless further information, such as an
assertion of independence, is provided.
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2.3.2 Probability Theory
The predominant formalisation of probability theory is that provided by Kol-
mogorov. These standard definitions may be found in any introductory text
on probability theory e.g. Grimmet and Welsh (1986). Given an experiment
or trial, such as rolling a die, the set of all possible outcomes or sample space
will be denoted Q. So, in the die example Q = {1,2,3,4,5,6}. Clearly, various
questions may be asked about the outcome of a trial. Some of these will be el¬
ementary, of the form "Was the outcome co?", but others will be about groups
of states. Returning to the die example, one might enquire "Was the outcome
an odd number?" Moreover, it is often convenient to specify the probability of
propositions modelled as such groups of atomic outcomes. The notion of an
event space is used to capture the idea that the relevant propositions should
be closed under logical operators.
Definition 2.3.1 (Event space). A set £ is termed an event space on a set Q of
possible outcomes if and only if
a) £CP(Q)
b) £ is non-empty.
c) If A e £ thenAc = Q\A e £
d) IfAi,A2,... G £ then (J^jA/e £
Events spaces are sometimes also referred to as "sigma algebras" and are said
to be closed under complementation and countable union. Observe that these
conditions entail that both Q and 0 = {} are elements of £. With the notion of
an event space in place it is possible to define the central concept of a proba-
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bility measure.
Definition 2.3.2 (Classical probability measure). Amapping P: £ —> 1R is termed
a probability measure on (Q, £) if and only if for all E\ ,£2 £ £
(CP1) P(£i)>0
(CP2) P(Q) = 1
(CP3) If E\ and £2 are disjoint (i.e. E\ CE2 = 0) then P(£i) + P(£2) =
P(£,U£2)
Where P is such a probability measure, the tuple (Q, £, P) is termed a probabil¬
ity space.
2.3.3 Conditional probability
Definition 2.3.3 (Conditional probability). Given a probability space (Q, £,P)
and E\ ,£2 € £ the conditional probability of E\ given £2, is defined as
P(£l I E2) = (2.42)
An immediate consequence of this definition is that conditional probability
with respect to a given event (£) is itself a probability measure i.e. (Q, £,P(jc |
£)) forms a probability space.
Although the bar notation (|) is standard, on closer inspection it is somewhat
misleading since bar is not a set-theoretic operation. The P of P(£i | £2), is
therefore not the same as the P of P(£j). For this reason, some probabilists prefer
the notation Pe2{E1) as this more clearly expresses the relationship with, but
difference from the original measure.
Chapter2. Background 32
To put things pragmatically for a moment, conditional probabilities have two
chief uses.
The first is to capture the effect of new information, that is understanding P(A |
B) and the probability that A will occur, given that B has already.
The second is in what artificial intelligence practitioners might term knowl¬
edge engineering. Here conditional probabilities may be used to construct a
probabilistic model from a sequence of hypothetical questions. In this case
P(A | B) may be understood as the probability that A would occur, should B.
Although these uses coincide in the classical case, there is a difference in em¬
phasis. In the first the unknown is the conditional, while in the second it is the
measure as a whole.
2.3.4 Random variables
Definition 2.3.4 (Random variable). Given a probability space (Q,£,P), and
a domain Dx, a function X : £2 —> Dx is termed a random variable on (Q, £,P) if
and only if for all x e Dx,
Note that where two or more random variables are defined with respect to
the same probability space it is trivial to construct a random variable that rep¬
resents their joint distribution. So, suppose X and Y are random variables,
consider Z : D —> Dx x Dy given by
Z~1(jc) = {toeD : X(m)=x}e'E (2.43)
Z : © i—> (X(co),F(co)) (2.44)
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Now for any z = (x,y) eDx xDY
Z-\z)=X-\x)CY-\y) (2.45)
which as a finite intersection of elements is in £.
2.3.5 Discrete random variables
Given a random variable X if Dx is finite, X is termed a discrete random variable.
Discrete random variables have a useful representational property through the
concept of a mass function.
Definition 2.3.5 (Mass function). Given a discrete random variable, X, defined
on a probability space (co, £,P), the function p : Dx —> [0,1] determined by
PxM = pWM) (2.46)
is termed the mass function of X.
Theorem 2.3.6 (Representation Theorem). Given a domain, D = {d\, d2,..., d^},
and K\, k2,..., 7p/ G [0,1] such that Ylf=\ ni = 1 there is a random variable, X with
domain such that for all di G D,
PxW = 1H (2.47)
Proof Since D is finite, define P : P(£>) —> [0,1] by
P(£)= y. <2-48)
i : di&E
By construction, P(D) = 1. Moreover, for all E\,E2 G P(D), P(£i) > 0 and if
E\ (1E2 = 0, P(Ei) +P(£,2) = P^i UE2)- So, (D,P(£>),P) is a probability space.
Finally, take X to be the identity map (mapping elements of D to themselves).
Clearly, px = ni as required. □
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This theorem allows the formal differences between probability measures and
mass functions to be elided most of the time.
2.3.6 Continuous random variables
Continuous random variables are simply random variables whose domain is
the Borel sigma algebra of R (or R" in the multivariate case). This is usually
expressed through the following equivalent definition.
Definition 2.3.7 (Continuous Random Variable). Given a probability space
(Q, £,P) a function X : Q —» R is termed a continuous random variable if and
only if for all a G R the preimage of (—°°, a] is in £ i.e.
{XGQ : X(jc)<(X}G£ (2.49)
2.4 Bayesian networks
Bayesian networks are a knowledge representation technique. As such they
have applications in knowledge engineering and machine-learning contexts.
This section describes the basic principles and advantages of BNs
2.4.1 Basic graph concepts
Bayesian networks are graphical models, for the purposes of conceptual and
notational clarity I will rehearse some basic concepts and defintions.
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Definition 2.4.1 (Simple graph). A simple graph is a pair, 0 = where V is
a finite set of vertices (or nodes) and a function
V^P(V\{v}) (2.50)
The nodes in ^3(v) are said to be the parents of v. The set {v} U^3(v) is termed
the family of v and denoted #(v)
Note that this definition excludes both reflexive loops (nodes that are their own
parents) and "multiple edges", which are sometimes considered in broader
graph theory. Graphs are depicted as circled nodes with arcs (or edges) con¬
necting them to their parents.
Definition 2.4.2 (Directed graph). The arc between two nodes, vj, V2 is said to
be undirected if vj G ^3(v2) and V2 G ^3(vj). If this is not the case, the arc is said
to be directed. Graphs containing only (un)directed arcs are themselves termed
(un)directed. If a graph contains a mixture of both directed and undirected
arcs, it is termed a chain graph.
Figure 2.2: Some examples of different types of graph
Undirected arcs are commonly depicted as plain connecting lines, whereas
directed arcs have arrow pointing from parent nodes to their children. Fig-
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ure 2.2(a) displays a sample chain graph with V = {A,B,C,D}, ^3(A) = {B,C},
<P(fl) = {A}, q3(C) = {A,B,D} and <p(D) = {5}.
Definition 2.4.3 (Connected graph). An undirected graph, 0 = (V, i)3) is said
to be connected if there is a "path" between any two nodes i.e. for all v\, vi G V
there is a sequence l\, I2, ■ ■ ■, In G V such that l\ = v\, 1^ = V2 and Z/+1 €W) for
all i E 1,2,... ,N — I.
Lemma 2.4.4. A directed acyclic graph, (V,^3) has at least one node, I such that for
all v &V, I f ^3(v). Such a node is termed a leaf.
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that every node has a child. In this case
there exists a sequence v\,V2, - ■ ■ ,vn such that v;+i G ^3(v,) for all i. However if
N > ]V| by the pigeon hole principle v,- = vj for some i f j. This contradicts the
acylicity of the graph. □
2.4.2 Representation
A Bayesian network represents a joint probability mass function as a directed
acyclic graph whose nodes correspond to discrete random variables. Associ¬
ated with each node is the conditional probability table for that variable given
its parent nodes. However, these associations are a matter of interpretation
whereas the network itself is a formal construct:
Definition 2.4.5 (Bayesian network). A Bayesian network consists of three ele¬
ments:
a) A finite directed acyclic graph, 0 = (V,i}3)
b) An association between each of node of 0, v, and a domain or set
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c) An association between each node of 0, v,- and a function
Pi '■ DVl x rL^O,) —► [0,1] (2.51)
with the property that for all (dn,di2,...dim) G rLe<p(v()Dv
^ ^ P;(d, di\, d[2,... djm) = 1
deDVi
(2.52)
Now, to flesh out the claim that such a graphical structure is an "appropriate"
representation for joint probability mass functions it will be useful to examine
two properties of the approach.
The first property is what Charniak (1991) calls consistency, that the product of
the node functions may be construed as a joint probability mass function.
Theorem 2.4.6 (Consistency). Given a Bayesian network as above, the product of
the node functions where (as before) v,y denotes the jth parent of node i,
1=1
determines a joint probability mass function on llvev Dv.
Proof By 2.3.6 it is sufficient to show that these terms are positive and sum to
unity. The proof proceeds by induction on N. Where N = 1 the result holds
trivially. Now suppose the result holds for all Bayesian networks with n nodes
and consider a Bayesian network with N+ 1 nodes. By 2.4.4, 0has a leaf node.
Removing this node yields a graph of n nodes which (by inductive hypothesis)
(2.53)
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the desired result is obtained. □
Consistency guarantees that the function encoded by a Bayesian network struc¬
ture has the right form to be a joint distribution. It does not, however, demon¬
strate any connection between the abstract node functions or graphical struc¬
ture and that distribution.
The second property - what will be termed completeness - shows that Bayesian
networks are a sufficient representation i.e. that every joint distribution can be
represented in that way.
Theorem 2.4.7 (Completeness). Any probability mass function can be represented
as a Bayesian network.
Proof. Given a joint mass function p(X\,X2,.. ■ -Xn), let 0 = (V,<$) where
V = {Xl,X2,...,XN} (2.58)
and
Xi^{XjEV : j < i} (2.59)
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Figure 2.3: A sufficient graph for a joint distribution with four random variables.
Note that these constructions are well-founded since N is finite. An example of
such a graph for a joint mass function withN = 4 is shown in Figure 2.3. Clearly





2.4.3 Inference in Bayesian networks
Bayesian networks are not only an efficient representation of a joint probability
distribution. The conditional independence relations encoded in the graphical
structure support a variety of algorithms for computing probabilities of inter¬
est. This process is commonly termed inference in Bayesian networks.
It is a well-established result (Cooper, 1990) that exact inference in Bayesian
networks is NP-hard (Garey and Johnson, 1979). Indeed Dagum and Luby
(1993) have proven the same of approximate inference within a given error
bound.
Nevertheless, outside the worst-case scenarios envisaged by complexity the¬
ory, the additional structure of conditional independence encoded by Bayesian
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networks, can be utilised to efficiently compute conditional probability values.
From the first-generation message-passing (Pearl, 1986,1988) techniques to the
current state-of-the-art join tree-based schemes (Lauritzen and Speigelhalter,
1988; Jensen, 1989; Huang and Darwiche, 1994) efficient inference algorithms
have a common objective: to re-arrange the directed factorisation of a joint
probability mass function in order to minimize the number of addition and
multiplication operations required.
By way of a concrete example suppose the task was to marginalise the Markov
chain
Hx,y,z) =f(x,y)g(y,z)h(z) (2.61)
with respect to y and z- The simplest approach is just to sum
Y f(x^y)s(y,z)h(z) (2.62)
yeDy,zeDz
This calculation involve |Z>y||Dz| additions and 2|Dy||Dz| multiplications. How¬
ever this sum of products may be re-arranged as
Y f(x>y)Y S(y^)h(z) (2.63)
yeDy zeDz
which requires only \Dy\ + \DZ\ additions and \Dy\\DZ \ multiplications. Although
the asymptotic time complexity remains exponential, this calculation can be
much more efficient in practice.
Algebraically, all that these transformations require is that the underlying ring
(or indeed semi-ring) be distributive.
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2.5 Summary
This chapter has sought to present in condensed form the mathematical nota¬
tion and concepts that underpin the work presented in this thesis.
The material presented in the first two sections, describing fuzzy logic and
probability theory, is an essential pre-requisites for understanding the follow¬
ing chapter. There a survey is made of the ways in which other fuzzy logic
researchers have attempted to hybridize fuzzy logic and probability theory.
But the detail provided above comes into play most crucially in Chapter 4
where the novel theory of Linguistic probabilities is developed. The various
concepts, theorems and lemmas marshaled above will feed into both the spec¬
ification of theory and the pendant analysis of its properties. Roughly speak¬
ing, the aim will be to "carry over" as much of classical probability theory as
possible, but also to illuminate the differences between the two.
The final section above, with its brisk sketch of Bayesian network researchmay
be largely disregarded until Chapter 5 where the theoretical application of the
Linguistic Bayesian network is presented.
Chapter 3
Vague probabilities
Over the years, various hybrid fuzzy-probabilistic theories have been presented
in the literature. It is convenient to think of these in context of the hierarchy of
classical probability theory a diagram of whichmay be found in Figure 3.1. The
ovals in this diagram represent different "spaces", understood conventionally
as classical sets, and the arrows represent the mappings whose definitions es¬
sentially characterise the theory. The various hybrid theories described here
may be seen as replacing one or more of the spaces, and the relevant functions
with appropriate fuzzy generalisations.
3.1 Fuzzy random variables
In practice there are many situations where the factors of interest are not real
numbers (or real vectors in the more general multivariate case) but linguis¬
tic terms. So, for example, one might be interested in whether a particular
42
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Outcomes
Figure 3.1: A schematic of conventional probability theory. The oval shapes represent
classical sets. In hybrid fuzzy-probabilistic theories, one or more of these is replaced
by an appropriate fuzzy generalisation.
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measurable is much greater than zero. Alternatively it may be the case that the
outcomes of an experiment are expressed in inexact linguistic terms. As an
example (derived from Puri and Ralescu (1986)), consider a survey whereby
people are asked to give their opinion about the weather. Typical responses
might include "cold", "not bad for this time of year" and so on. In this context
is reasonable to ask: What is the average opinion about the weather?
The term "fuzzy random variable" was first introduced in the literature by
Kwakernaak (1978a,b) and refined by Kruse and Meyer (1987). In this theory
(KKM) fuzzy random variables are interpreted as fuzzy perceptions of classical
random variables (referred to as the original of its fuzzy counterpart), much as
a linguistic label can be interpreted as fuzzy perceptions of its base variable.
Of the two, the second framework is more general but their equivalence under
reasonable assumptions has been demonstrated by Zhong and Zhou (1987).
The main difference seems to be stylistic - Kwakernaak's framework is more
real-analysis oriented, Puri and Ralescu's more topological. In both settings
it is possible to give well-founded fuzzy counterparts of statistics such as ex¬
pected value and variance (Kruse and Meyer, 1987; Puri and Ralescu, 1986).
There are also proofs ofmajor limit theorems such versions of the Law of Large
Numbers and the Central Limit Theorem. Summaries of these results can be
found in Corral et al. (1998) and Ralescu (1995b).
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An alternative type of approach concerns what conclusions may be drawn
about a classical probabilistic system on the basis of available fuzzy informa¬
tion. Okuda et al. (1978) and Tanaka et al. (1979) have developed techniques
centring on the concept of a fuzzy information system.
Given a probability space (Q, 2>,P) and a classical random variable, X a Borel-
measurable fuzzy set of X (Q) is termed fuzzy information. A partition (in the
sense of Ruspini (1970)) is then defined to model all available observations.
3.3 Zadeh's fuzzy probabilities
The term "fuzzy probability" first appears, albeit incidentally, in the second
part of Lotfi Zadeh's seminal paper on linguistic variables (Zadeh, 1975b).
Here, Zadeh mentions in passing that fuzzy quantifiers, which are introduced
to capture the sense of vague quantifiers such as "most" or "few" can be thought
of as being like fuzzy probabilities. It was not until the mid-eighties, how¬
ever, that Zadeh revisited the idea. In "Fuzzy probabilities" (Zadeh, 1984) he
presents two quite separate answers to the question "What is the probability
of a fuzzy event?".
The following section outlines Zadeh's approach with reference to a simple
data-centred example. It is followed by critical examination of the two tech¬
niques which identifies a series of statistical, theoretical and technical ambigu¬
ities and deficiencies.
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x b0 b\ b2 bi £4 b5 b6 bq bg bg
pB(x) 0.4 0 0.2 0.8 1 0 0.9 0.4 0.1 0.5
Table 3.1: A bag of balls and their blackness
The main example of Zadeh (1984) seeks to assess the probability that a car,
c, will be stolen as the probability that a randomly selected car is (fuzzily)
like c and has been stolen. This is inexplicable as it is clear that a conditional
probability (what is the chance that a car will be stolen given that it is like c?)
would be more appropriate.
As a basis for the following discussion then, consider instead a bag containing
10 balls of varying shade. The fuzzy set of black balls (with respect to the uni¬
verse of discourse U = {bo,b\,...bg}) has a membership function pn listed in
Table 3.1. Zadeh's approaches will then be assessed with respect to the ques¬
tion: What is the probability of selecting a black ball?
3.3.1 ZFP Type 1
Zadeh's first approach to this question calculates the desired probability in
terms of the crisp "cardinality" (or "sigma-count") of B. This is obtained by
simply summing up the membership function of the fuzzy set.
Xcount(fl) = 0.4 + 0 + 0.2 + 0.8 + 1 + 0 + 0.9 + 0.4 + 0.1 + 0.5 = 4.3 (3.1)
The probability is then calculated by dividing this through by the size of the
universe of discourse i.e.
(3-2)
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3.3.2 ZFP Type 2
Zadeh's second definition relies on the concept of "fuzzy cardinality" which
is rather loosely defined in terms of the "sigma representation" of a fuzzy set.
Cleaning up some ambiguities and recasting in modern notation yields the
following definition,
Definition 3.3.1 (Zadeh's fuzzy cardinality). Given D, a universe of discourse
and A, a fuzzy set defined over D, the fuzzy cardinality ofA,
FGcount(A)la= [|AL1|,|ALa|] (3.3)
Or, equivalently,
/^FGcount(A) (*) = max {max(//A(*')) : X £ P(D) A |X| < x} (3.4)
X cZL
Definition 3.3.2 (Zadeh's fuzzy probability). Given D, a (finite) universe of
discourse and A, a fuzzy set defined on that universe, the fuzzy probability of
(3.5)
Returning then to the black ball example, this definition yields the fuzzy num¬
ber with the membership function,








0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2
Probability
Figure 3.2: The fuzzy probability, ZFP(B). As is conventional the discontinuous mem¬
bership function has been drawn with a single line.
Chapter 3. Vague probabilities 49
0 x < 0.1
1 * = 0.1
0.9 0.1 <*<0.2
0.8 0.2 <*<0.3




0 * > 0.8
(3.6)
This is graphed in Figure 3.2.
3.3.3 Critical evaluation
Although these approaches have a certain intuitive appeal, they share a num¬
ber of serious problems.
First, the definitions involved tacitly assume a finite set of outcomes with
equiprobable elements. Such a space, although commonplace in didactic ex¬
amples involving cards and coins, does not provide an adequate framework
for infinite sets of outcomes (as required for continuous random variables).
The assumption that outcomes are equiprobable is also problematic - consider,
to take a trivial example, an unfair coin.
This said, it is relatively easy to see how to begin to remedy these deficiencies.
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Definition 3.3.3 (Measurable fuzzy set). Given a probability space (Q,£,P)
a fuzzy set A (defined over Q) is said to be measurable if and only if for all
(X G [0,1], A^a G
By definition a fuzzy set is measurable if and only if its membership function
is measurable (in the usual sense). Note also that the measurable sets form a
closed class under (fuzzy) intersection, union and complementation.
Now, supposing that A is a measurable fuzzy set the natural extension of
Zadeh's first measure, ZP, is the Lebesgue integral,
However, even if it is accepted that these formulations resolve the technical
issues with Zadeh's approaches the resulting theory of probability has unde¬
sirable consequences.
First, the sort of fuzzy probabilities envisaged by ZFPall have the same sort of
"left-crisp" shape - speaking loosely that of a right angle triangle facing to the
right. Thus ZFP is out of the running when it comes to grounding subjective
probability assessments such as "about an even chance".
Another concern, invited perhaps by the concentration of two quite separate
ideas into a single paper, is that there are no guidelines for applicability i.e.
(3.7)
An analogue for ZFP is similarly well-defined:
ZFP'(A)La = [P(AL1),P(ALa)] (3.8)
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when to use the crisp probability of a fuzzy event and when the fuzzy. It is
perhaps unfair to level this criticism at what is clearly a preliminary investiga¬
tion, but on the other hand this lack of context makes it difficult to see how to
extend the work.
Finally, whilst Zadeh's approach may be useful for such data-centred applica¬
tions, from the point of view of the probability theorist this approach is some¬
what dubious as it rests on the assumption that the set out outcomes is both
finite and that individual outcomes are equiprobable.
Zadeh's theory then, as a finite theory, cannot be expected to provide ana¬
logues for classical random variables. But worse still, the equiprobability as¬
sumption means that it is restricted to analytic examples (such as lotteries and
card games) where all information is available. Ideally a theory of fuzzy prob¬
abilities would support a clear calculus in their own terms rather than, as here,
a frequentist estimation method.
3.4 Bayesian Fuzzy probabilities
On Zadeh's theory fuzziness in a probability is secondary - merely a shadow
of the primary fuzziness of the event of interest itself. Although survey papers
have tended to conflate the two, it is exactly this point that distinguishes the
different approach to "fuzzy probabilities" taken by Jain and Agogino (1990).
Arguably this paper has been the most influential publication in the area, how¬
ever it will be demonstrated that for technical reasons the theory it presents
cannot provide a satisfactory model for qualitative probability assessments.
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Jain and Agogino call their version of fuzzy probabilities "Bayesian fuzzy prob¬
abilities". The presentation here differs substantially from the original formu¬
lation of these ideas. In particular, Jain and Agogino do not explicitly use the
idea of a probability measure either to locate their belief measure, bf, in the
context of an event space or to define the associcated "mean" function, m.
Definition 3.4.1 (Bayesian fuzzy probability measure). Given an event algebra,
£, defined over a set of outcomes, Q, a function bf from the set of events to the
set of "convex normalised fuzzy set[s] ... of [0,1]" is a Bayesian fuzzy probability
measure if and only if for all A,B e £
(BF1) bf(A) has a unique "mean" i.e. there is a function m : £ —► [0,1]
such that for all x e [0,1], /<bf(A)(x) — 1 if and only if x = m(A) (in this
case bf(A) is said to be unimodal)
(BF2) /Mbf(A) is continuous on (0,1)
(BF3) m (as defined in BF1) is a probability measure
(BF4) bf(Q) = lx
(BF5) If A and B are disjoint then bf(A) ©bf(fi) = bf(A UB)
At first sight this definition seems reasonable and indeed it can and has be
used as an informal theory for reasoning with fuzzy probabilities, however
as a formal theory it is seriously defective as a consequence of the following
Lemma.
Lemma 3.4.2. For any event E e £, Pbf(E)(x) = 0 for all x < m(E). Such a member¬
ship function is termed left-crisp.
Proof Consider an arbitrary event £e£. By definition bf(E) has a unique
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mode m(E) e [0,1] such that /tb{^(m(E)) = 1 = Ebf(Ec)(1 -m(E)). Suppose, for
a contradiction, that 0 < Pbf(E)(x) — 1 f°r some 0 < x < m{E). Clearly, 0 < 1 —
m(E)+ x < 1 and by the definition of ©
0 = lx(l —m(E)+x)
= Ebf(EUEc) (1 —m(E)+x)




which is the desired contradiction. Hence Pbfp{E) (x) — 0 ^or aH x <m(E). □
Thus every BFP is necessarily left-crisp and therefore the theory cannot act as
a formal model for vague probability assessments such as "quite likely" which
tail-off smoothly to the left of their peak. Note that this criticism applies also
to Zadeh's fuzzy probabilities.
Worse still, there are two ways to strengthen this result to a proof that BFPs
can only be embedded point probabilities (i.e. both left and right-crisp), both
of which seem to reflect Jain and Agogino's intentions if not their precise for¬
mulation.
First, © is an operator defined on the fuzzy reals, not pairs of "convex nor¬
malised fuzzy set[s] ...of [0,1]". Lemma 1 rests only on the assumption that
Jain and Agogino tacitly intended some form of © restricted to the unit inter¬
val. Without such a restriction Bayesian fuzzy probabilities reduce immedi¬
ately to embedded classical probabilities. To see this, suppose that for some
Chapter 3. Vague probabilities 54
m(E) <x<\,/%(£)(x) > 0. Then, as before,
0 = p\x{\-m(E)+x)
= <"bf(£U£C) (1 —m(E)+x)
> min(^bf(£)(x),(Mbf(£c)(l-m(E)))
> 0
And thus, bf(£) = m(E)x.
Second, it seems clear from their examples, that Jain and Agogino intend that
for all E G £, bf(Zs) = \x ©bf(£'c). Indeed this principle has considerable in¬
tuitive appeal, since it is roughly equivalent to the assertion that if you know
something (however imprecise) about the probability of an event, then you
know "just as much" about the probability of that event's complement. This
will be elaborated further in the following Section.
But in this case, since every event is the complement of some left-crisp event,
all events are also right-crisp. Again, the theory reduces to an embedding
of classical point probabilities. Similar criticisms of the existing theories, al¬
beit couched in very different language and developed independently can be
found in Gert de Cooman's most recent work (de Cooman, 2003a) on possi-
bilistic previsions.
3.5 Relationship with Type-2 fuzzy sets
There is a formal resemblence between the two theories of fuzzy probability
described above and Type-2 fuzzy sets (Mendel and John, 2002; Mendel et al.,
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2007). First, like fuzzy probabilities, Type-II fuzzy sets may be derived from
the process of fuzzification, applied in this case to fuzzy sets themselves. So,
the membership function of a Type-2 fuzzy set maps from some universe of
discourse to fuzzy sets of the unit interval (usually fuzzy numbers). Like any
derived fuzzy theory, the Extension Principle may then be used to develop
analogues for associated functions and relations. In the case of Type-2 fuzzy
systems this means the fundamental truth-functional operators and inference
procedures of conventional fuzzy logic.
The second similarity is that, as the name suggests Type-2 fuzzy theory is a
second-order theory of uncertainty, which is to say that it represents an at¬
tempt to represent and process uncertainty about uncertainty. The primary
uncertainty of Type-2 approaches is however that of vagueness or conceptual
fit.
Although there are these two methodological and formal similarities between
the Type-2 fuzzy modelling strategy and the approaches advanced by advo¬
cate of fuzzy probabilies there are equally significant differences. The crucial
point is that fuzzy logic (like classical logic) is a truth-functional calculus -
the truth values of individual propositions fully determine the truth values of
compound propositions. At risk of labouring the point, this is simply not the
casewith probability theory where the probabilities of individual events do (in
themselves) determine the probability of a compound event.
These differences mean that the representations, techniques, questions and an¬
swers associated with the growing body of literature on Type-2 fuzzy sets
are different from those clustered around the idea of fuzzfying probabilities.
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Thus whilst acknowledging a certain commonality of interest and approach,
the present work is quite independent of that area of study.
3.6 Summary
This chapter has reviewed a number of hybrid fuzzy-probabilistic theories in
an attempt to locate the research that will be presented in the following chap¬
ters with respect to existing work in the area. The discussion centred on the
contributions from Zadeh and Jain and Agogino which are the most widely
cited theories of "fuzzy probability".
A close analysis of these theories showed that they have significant weak¬
nesses. Zadeh's work is practically-oriented and because it lacks a formali-
sation, not immediately applicable outside data-centric context and (relatedly)
ill-at-ease with contemporary subjectivist accounts of probabilities. Jain and
Agogino's work is therefore to be praised for its attempt to address these is¬
sues by providing a formalisation of the concepts. However, as shown above,
this formalisation is fundamentally flawed, with their Bayesian fuzzy proba¬
bilities reducing immediately to embedded classical (or "point") probabilities.
Nevertheless, the core ideas behind these two bodies of work are sound. In




This chapter introduces the theory of linguistic probabilities. The presentation
here is self-consciously patterned after the exposition of classical probability
theory in Chapter 2 to emphasise the parallels between the proposed and the
classical constructions.
The first section presents the basic characterisation of linguistic probability
measures. The axioms are discussed and some simple consequences of the the¬
ory examined. The second section builds upon these measure-theoretic foun¬
dations by developing a theory of linguistic random variables. The discrete
case is examined in some detail and - crucially - an analogue for the classical
representation theorem for discrete random variables is provided. The chapter
closes with a sketch of how the theory might be developed to cover continuous
linguistic random variables.
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4.1 Linguistic probability measures
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As with the classical theory, Linguistic probabilities are defined in terms of a
measurable function.
Definition 4.1.1 (Linguistic probability measure). Given an event algebra E
defined over a set of outcomes Q, a function LP : E —»IR/ is termed a linguistic
probability measure if and only if for all A,B e E
(LP1) 0X^LP(AH1X
(LP2) LP(Q) = lx
(LP3) If A i ,A2 ■ ■ ■ are a sequence of pairwise disjoint events then
oo oo
£LP(A,) 2 LP([>) (4.1)
i i
(LP4) LP (A) = 1X©LP(AC)
where LP is a linguistic probability measure on (Q, £), the tuple (Q,£,LP) is
termed a linguistic probability space. Note that the ^ notation represents an
ininite sum of the sort discussed in 2.2.7.
Like the first two axioms of classical probability theory LP1 and LP2 simply
specify the quantity space in which probabilities will be assessed. Note that
LP1 entails that linguistic probabilities have zero membership outside the unit
interval and (together with LP4) that LP(0) = 0X. Again, although the choice of
unit interval is somewhat arbitrary it simplifies the definition of expectation.
The most significant parts therefore are LP3 and LP4. The underlying intuition
is that vagueness in a probability acts as a soft constraint on all probabilities
that are logically linked to it.
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LP3 - countable subadditivity - is intended to capture the intuition one might
know the probability of the union of (say) two disjoint events more precisely
than the probabilities of either individually. Consider, for example, tossing a
coin which one is told is almost unbiased. Here, knowledge about the proba¬
bility of the result being heads (or tails) is uncertain, but the probability that
resultwill be either heads or tails is certain (and equal to 1). Equally, the prob¬
ability that the result will not be both heads and tails is certain (and equal to 0).
Note that LP3 is asserting that LP(A;) is a convergent series.
In a similar vein, LP4 expresses that knowing something about the probability
of an event translates into equally precise knowledge about the probability of
its complement. Or, to put it another way, that it is unthinkable that one might
have more knowledge about the probability of an event than it's complement.
4.1.1 Properties of linguistic probability measures
Classical probability measures are monotonic and this property is shared by
linguistic probability measures as the following theorem demonstrates.
Theorem 4.1.2. (Q, *E,LP) and A,B e "E ifA C B, then LP (A) =<! LP(5)
Proof. By LP3, for any a e [0,1] LP(fl) C LP(A) ©LP(fi\A),
Now, |LP(5\A)Ja > 0 and hence [LP(fi)Ja > |_LP(A)Ja. On the other hand,
since LP(AC) C LP(5C) ®LP(AC\5C),
LLP(£)Ja > |_LP(A)Ja+ |_LP(fi\A)Ja (4.2)
|_LP(Ac)Ja > LLP(flc)Ja+ LLP(Ac\Sc)Ja (4.3)
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As before, |_LP(Ac\Bc)Ja > 0 and hence
|~LP(A)]a = 1 - LLP((cA))Ja < 1 - [LP(fic)Ja = [LP(fi)la □
In classical probability theory there is an important result asserting that prob¬
ability measure are continuous. This result paves the way for continuous ran¬
dom variables and density functions. Linguistic probability measures also
share this property.
Theorem 4.1.3. Given a linguistic probability space (D,£,LP), and an increasing
sequenceA\ CA2C... with limit A = |JJ°Ai then
LP (A) = lim LP(A„) (4.4)
n—>00
Proof. Define a sequence #„ such that
Bi=Ai+l\Al (4.5)
Clearly the Bts are disjoint from one another and from A,- (for a given i). Hence,
by LP3, for all N,
00
LP(A) C LP(A;v) ©^ LP(fl;) (4.6)
N
By Theorem 4.1.2 the sequence of partial sums is decreasing and bounded be¬
low (by 0y ) and therefore converges. Furthermore,
00
XLP(£;)=°x (4-7)
Now since all limits exist,




LP(AaT) C LP(Ac) 0 Jo LP(5/) (4.9)
N
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and hence
lx © lim LP(An) = lim LP(Ayvc) C LP(AC) = ly ©LP(A) (4.10)N—N—>
thus, by Lemma 2.2.9,
lim LP(A,v) C LP (A) (4.11)
N—>°°
Taken together 4.8 and 4.11 yield the desired result. □
4.1.2 Relation with classical probabilities
Linguistic probability measures generalise classical probability measures in
the sense of the following Lemmas.
Lemma 4.1.4. Given a classical probability measure, P, the map LP : £ —> IR,^ deter¬
mined by LP (A) = (P(A))X is a linguistic probability measure.
Proof. Clearly, LP(Q) = lx, LP(0) = 0X and 0X =4 LP (A) ^ lx for all A G £ as
required. Now for pairwise disjoint A\,A2... G £,
00 00 00
lp(L>) = (p(UA'))x=(E/><A'))x <4A2>
i i i




Finally, for all A G £. LP(A) = (P(A))X = (1 -P(AC))X = 1X0LP(AC). □
Thus any classical probabilitymeasure has an (unique embedding as an) equiv¬
alent linguistic probability measure. Similarly, any linguistic probability mea¬
sure assigning only embedded point probabilities uniquely determines a clas¬
sical probability measure.
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Lemma 4.1.5. Given a linguistic probability measure, LP, such that for all A e £,
LP (A) = (PA)xfor some pa € R the map, P : £ —> [0,1], determined by P(A) = pa is a
probability measure.
Proof. Clearly, P(0) = 0 and P(A) > 0 for all A G £ as required. Now, given
disjoint A, ,A2 ...GJ and letting A = \JfAir
oo oo oo
(pA)x = LP(A) C gLP(A,) = J>.4,)z = (4.14)
i i i
By Lemma 2.2.4, pa = Y17 PAi as required. □
4.2 Conditional probability
As discussed in Chapter 2, conditional probabilities have two aspects. First
they provide a means of updating a probability measure on receipt of new
information. Second they allow the construction of complex probability mea¬
sures through the consideration of simple what-if scenarios.
Given a linguistic probability space (Q, £,LP), suppose one discovers that A 6
£ has occurred. How should this affect ones knowledge about the linguistic
probability of some other event 5? As in the classical case, the idea will be to
restrict the measure to A and normalise yielding a new probability measure.
In classical probability theory the quantity space is a field (the real line) so this
"normalization" is unproblematic. However the case of linguistic probabilities
is not so clear cut.
To frame the issuemore precisely: given a linguistic probability space (Q, £, LP)
and E e £ (such that LP(£) <G (0Z, lz]) is there a "conditional" linguistic proba-
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bility measure on the sigma algebra (E, {E nA : A £ £}) such that
LP(£) <8> LP£(A) = LP(E DA) (4.15)
for allAg£?
The following example shows that the answer to this question is negative at
least in some cases. Consider flipping a perfectly fair coin. If the result is
heads then the coin is flipped again. If not, then an approximately fair coin is
flipped instead. The event that the first coin is heads will be denoted A, the
event that the second coin - whichever coin is used - is heads, B. Table 4.1
represents a linguistic probability measure that might reasonably be used to
model this scenario.
Table 4.1: The coins example that proves conditionalisations of linguistic probability
examples do not always exist.
Now consider the composite event, D, that both coins - whichever coin is used




D = ((AnS)U(AenBc)) (4.16)
The linguistic probability of D may be computed as [0.45,0.55]x, since
LP(D)©0.25X = LP(D)©LP(AC) D lx © [0.2,0.3]x = [0.7,0.8]x (4.17)
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LP(xny) x = a x = ac
Y = B [0.03,0.08]x [0.06,0.14]x
Y = BC [0.16,0.27]x [0.56,0.72]x
Table 4.2: A fully-factorable linguistic probability measure
and
LP(D) C LP(AnZ?) ©LP(Acn5c) = 0.25x© [0.2,0.3]x = [0.45,0.55]x (4.18)
This accords with intuition, since D's probability is, roughly speaking, depen¬
dent on the probability that the approximately fair coin yields heads. How¬
ever, there can be no conditional linguistic probability measure with respect to
D that satisfies equation 4.15 since no fuzzy number multiplied by [0.45,0.55]x
will yield 0.25x = LP(A flfi).
But this example is also factorable, in the sense that conditioning on A yields a
consistent linguistic probability measure with
LP (A) = LP(AC) = 0.5X (4.19)
LPA(fl)=LPA(flc)=:0.5x (4.20)
LPAc(B) = LPAC(B) = [0.4,0.6]x (4.21)
The linguistic probability measure tabulates in Table 4.2 shows that there are
"non-trivial" fully-factorable measures.
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4.3 Linguistic random variables
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As in classical probability theory random variables are often more useful than
events, although as we shall see, there is a simple connection between the two.
The notation used in this section will generally suggest the univariate case.
However, it should be noted that the results presented apply equally and im¬
mediately to the multivariate case by considering the domains that are Carte¬
sian products of other sets.
The definition of a linguistic analogue to a classical random variable is straight¬
forward:
Definition 4.3.1 (Linguistic random variable). Given a linguistic probability
space (Q, £, LP), and a domain Dx, a function X : Q —* Dx is termed a linguistic
random variable on (Q, £, LP) if and only if for all x £ Dx,
Z"1(x) = {coeQ : X(co)=x} 6 £ (4.22)
Where Dx is finite, X is termed a linguistic discrete random variable.
4.3.1 Linguistic discrete random variables
Definition 4.3.2 (Discrete linguistic random variable). Given a linguistic prob¬
ability space (Q, £,LP), and a domain Dx, a function X : £2 —> Dx is termed a
discrete linguistic random variable on (Q, £,LP) if and only if:
a) Image(X) = {A(co) : to € Q} is countable
b) For all x £ Dx, {co £ Q : X (to) = x} £ T.
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Definition 4.3.3 (Mass function). The mass function of a discrete linguistic ran¬
dom variable, X on (Q, £,LP) is the function, lpx : Dx 3R'/ determined by
lpx(x) - LP({co G Q. : X(co) = jc}) (4.23)
By definition, a linguistic mass function satisfies
^ lPx(x) ^ 'x (4.24)
and
lpxW Q ljc©(5°^Px(*')) (4.25)
xiyx
for all x G Dx- Note that b) also entails that lx Q \px (x) since for any x G Dx,
1 % © Ipx (*) ® lPx (x) (4-26)




Whilst these conditions are necessary they are also sufficient in the sense of the
following theorem.
Theorem 4.3.4 (Representation Theorem). IfD = {d,- : i G /} is a non-emptyfinite
set (indexed by I) and {tt; : i el} is a set offuzzy numbers such that for all i G I
0X ^ m -4 lx (4.29)
and
Kj C ixe j (4.30)
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then there exists a linguistic probability space, (Q, £,LP) and a discrete linguistic
random variable, X, on (Q, £, LP) with the mass function
{Kj ifd = di for some i G I (4.31)Qy otherwise
Proof. The proof proceeds by construction. Let Q — D, £ = P(Q) and define
LP : £ -»■ by
LP(A) = ( g Ki) n (lx© JT Tii) n [0,l]x (4.32)
i : djCA i :
By definition LP(fi) = lx and LP(0) = 0X as required. Now, for anyA G £ since
and Qy =4 tc, for all i G I there is an x G [0,1] such that
= 1 ^ ^Z©S<:^W = 1 (433)
Hence LP (A) as defined is in [0y. 1 x]. Since S is finite it suffices to consider
disjoint A, B E £. By definition,
LP(AUfl) C X 7t' = ( X ^ ® ( X 7t() C LP(A) ©LP(Z?) (4.34)
i : djCAUB i : dteA i :
Similarly, by definition,
1X©LP(AC) = lx©{( ^ 71,-) fl (lx© ^ 71,-) n [0, l]x} (4.35)
i : dteAc i : d$Ac
= (1x© X 7C'')n(ix©ix© 7C')n[°'i]x (4-36)
i : diCAc i : d$Ac
— LP (A) (4.37)
Thus (Q, £,LP) is a linguistic probability space.
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Finally, define X : £2 —> Q as the identity i.e. such that X (co) = CO. Now, given
d G D, if d / di for all i G /, X"1^) = 0 and hence lpx(d) = 0X. Otherwise,
X~l (d) = {di] for some i G I and since 7U/ C lx 0 Syy;Ttj
This theorem is important for practical applications of the theory as it allows
probabilistic modelling to dispense with measure theory almost all the time
and concentrate on random variables which are typically the entities of inter¬
est. It is also an essential component in the proof that linguistic analogues for
Bayesian networks can be constructed.
Note that the full strength of condition 4.30 is only required to prove that the
constructed linguistic random variable exactly coincides with the relevant 7t/.
If it were replaced by the significantly weaker condition
then (co, £,LP) as constructed above would still be a linguistic probability space.
Thus 4.32 can also be seen as a procedure for correcting an improperly speci¬
fied random variable.
4.3.2 Real-valued discrete linguistic random variables
lpx(s) = LP({4}) = 7C/ □
(4.38)
A (fuzzy) real-valued linguistic random variable is simply a random variable
whose domain is the (fuzzy) real line. Where the variable is also discrete i.e.
having only a finite range, expectation can be calculated in the usual way.
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Definition 4.3.5 (Expectation). Given a (fuzzy) real-valued discrete linguistic
random variable X : Q —> Dx on (Q, £,LP), the expectation ofX,E(X) is defined
by
£W=(S^LP(X-'W)®^ ifDxCE <4 39)
[SreDxLP(X-'W) 0* if Dx C R^
Since the fuzzy numbers form a commutation semi-ring, this expectation shares
many properties with its classical counterpart. So, for example, expectation is
linear in the sense that for all cc, P E R-^
£(ocX + PF) = a<g)£(X)©p<g>£(F) (4.40)
4.3.3 Continuous linguistic random variables
As in the classical case, random variables are essentially integrable functions
e.g.
Definition 4.3.6 (Continuous linguistic random Variable). Given a linguistic
probability space (Q, EjLP), a map
X : Q —> R (4.41)
is termed a continuous linguistic random variable if and only if for all x e R
{cog Q : X(oo) <x} e £ (4.42)
4.4 Summary
This chapter introduced the axiomatic characterisation of linguistic probability
theory. Following a brief discussion of these axioms which sought to ground
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them in a set of reasonable normative insights, some basic properties of lin¬
guistic probability measures were demonstrated to wit: monotonicity and con¬
tinuity. These fundamental properties pave the way for the following devel¬
opments.
Next, the relationship with classical probabilities was examined. Itwas demon¬
strated that the natural embedding of a classical probability measure is consis¬
tent with the axioms of linguistic probability theory, and that conversely a lin¬
guistic probability measure ranging over embedded real numbers corresponds
exactly to a classical probability measure.
After this, the issue of conditional probability was examined. The key result of
this section was that (unlike their classical counterparts) linguistic probability
measures are not necessarily "factorable" - put simply, given such a measure,
a decomposition into conditional and prior need not exist.
Finally, the theory was used to develop fuzzy analogues for random variables.
The discrete case was explored in some detail and a sketch of the approach to
continuous case was presented.
As explained in Chapter 2, these last two elements, conditionals and discrete
random variables are the essential constituents of a Bayesian graphical repre¬




This chapter develops an analogue to classical Bayesian networks. A set of
sufficient criteria for an annotated graph to represent a discrete linguistic joint
probability mass function are presented. This can be understood as showing
the soundness of the representation. The issue of representational complete¬
ness is then discussed. No conclusion is presented on this point although it
is shown that the standard constructive proof strategy is not applicable in this
context. Inference procedures are then examined and it is shown that best-
of-breed classical procedures may be utilised with little modification. These
points are illustrated by converting a classical Bayesian network to the pro¬
posed scheme.
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5.1 Representation
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In order to prove that it is possible to specify a linguistic joint probability dis¬
tribution in the form of a Bayesian network, it is sufficient to show that mul¬
tiplying the conditional probability table at a node by its priors yields a joint
distribution. The following Lemma and Theorem present this result for dis¬
crete linguistic random variables. The Lemma is intuitively very obvious, but
rather fiddly.




/:D/ = nLA-[Oz,lz] (5.2)
and
8 '■ Dg — Do x EEiA*-) [fyo IjJ (5.3)
whereM > 1 and o is an injection,
o:{l,2,...,M}—*{1,2,...,7V} (5.4)
such that
a) f(x) c lxe ^yeDf . yy-xf{y) for allx e Df
b) g(x) C lx e E}-e/), : yoAo 8{y) for all x e Dg
then for all x = (xq,xi ,.. .x^) 6 D
fix 1 jX2,.. ., JQv)£K-h}>-*-o(l) >-hj(2) !••• )
22 /(>'i'3;2,-.-,yv)g(yo,yo(i)>3;a(2),---,Jo(M))) (5-5)
y^D : y=£x
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Proof.
f(xi >X2, • • • j-^iv)g(^0j-^a(l) )-hj(2) > • • • )
Qf(xi,X2,...,XN)(\xQ g(yo>*a(l)»*a(2)>--->*<y(A#))) (5-6)
yo^xo
Q f(xl,X2, ■ ■ ■ ,XN) ef(xUX2, . ■ ■ ,XN) g(yO,Xo(l),Xo(2), ■ ■ ■ ,*o(M))) (5-7)
yo^xo
C lx© ^f(yi,y2,...,yN)Qf(xi,x2,...,xN) JT g(yo,-Xo(i),-*a(2)>• • • >*a(M)))
yi+M yofao
(5.8)




C1X©( ^Cyi ,^2, - - -,W)S,Cvo,>'ct(I),3'ct(2)» - - - »yCT(A#))) D
ye£> : y^x
This Lemma shows that the mass functions of a set of conditional and prior
discrete linguistic variables (under certain reasonable conditions) can be com¬
bined to form a joint distribution. The details of this are spelt out in the fol¬
lowing Theorem.
Theorem 5.1.2 (Representation Theorem for linguistic Bayesian networks). Given
a graph, 0 = (V,Pa) and functions, fi,f2,---,fn and g with domains D\,D2,...,Dn
and D* = Dx 117=1A respectively, and the common range [0X, lx], such that for all
i E {1,2,...,n},x = (x,xi,x2,...,xn) eD*,
a) fiixt) C lx© Ey/x,/'W)
b) g(x) c ljcQEy/jcSCO
f/zen f/zere exist random variablesX,X\,X2,,Xn with respective domains D.D \ ,D2,... ,Dn
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such that for all i e 1,2,..., n
!Px, (*) = fi (x) for all xeDi (5.10)




Proof The proof follows by induction on the size of the graph, i. Where i = 0
the result follows immediately from the preceding Lemma and 4.3.4. Now
suppose the result holds for n = N, given /i ,/2.. -fN+\, the product of the first
N fs satisfies the preconditions for the preceding Lemma, thus so do all /V + 1.
And by a further application of the Lemma,
N+1 N+\
g(*) n ^ h(e ^g(y) n (s-12)
i= i yyx i—i
By 4.3.4 the desired result is obtained. □
In ordinary language, this theorem demonstrates that the product of appropri¬
ate node functions is of the correct form to represent a linguistic joint probabil¬
ity mass function.
5.2 Completeness
Theorem 2.4.7 demonstrated that every joint probability mass function can be
represented as a Bayesian network. This result was an almost trivial conse¬
quence of Bayes' Theorem. Given a joint probability mass function for N vari¬
ables (X\,X2,... ,Xn) it considered the sort of fully-connected graph displayed
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in Figure 2.3. Each node was then identified with a random variable and asso¬
ciated with the corresponding conditional probability mass function. By con¬
struction, this graphical model exactly represents the original joint probability
mass function.
The considerations marshaled in Section 4.2, however show that the construc¬
tive proof strategy cannot be used to prove the parallel result for linguistic
Bayesian networks. As was demonstrated, even trivial bivariate linguistic joint
distributions are not necessarily factorable. In such a case, it is not possible to
decompose the joint distribution into a prior and a conditional. Hence no such
Bayesian network representation exists.
5.3 Inference in linguistic Bayesian networks
As in the classical case both exact and inexact inference procedures are avail¬
able. Section 2.4.3 showed that efficient exact inference algorithms for classical
Bayesian networks rely on re-arranging and eliminating terms from the sum
of products expression for the joint mass function. These optimizations rely on
properties of classical Bayesian networks. First, redundancy elimination meth¬
ods such as Bayes' Ball utilise the fact that screened sections of the network ef¬
fectively sum to 1. Once redundant terms have been eliminated, the query sum
may be most efficiently calculated by rearranging the factors allowing summa¬
tions to be "pushed in" as far as possible. These rearrangements require both
commutativity and distributivity.
Since linguistic probability mass functions share to a great extent these prop-
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erties, the classical algorithms apply without modification, although there are
some differences in interpretation which require further elaboration.
First, since by definition LP^(A) = 1 x, redundancy elimination methods work
in exactly the same way. Indeed where redundancy elimination offers only
improved efficiency in classical networks, in linguistic Bayesian networks, it
also improves the "quality" of the resulting answer. The naive approach to
computing a query would involve processing terms of the form
by summing the values of \px. Where these are fuzzy the computed sum will
also be some fuzzy number subsuming 1^. However it is evident that the value
must be exactly 1%. Thus redundancy elimination in linguistic Bayesian net¬
works doubles as a way of removing unnecessary uncertainty.
The rearrangement of terms, via the junction tree algorithm, also carries over to
linguistic Bayesian networks, albeit with one small caveat. As stated in Chap¬
ter 2, the fuzzy reals whilst commutative are not distributive, but subdistribu-
tive. Thus whilst it is legitimate to permute the multiplicands, "pushing in"
the summations introduces additional uncertainty. In practice this means that
as in manual calculations the output of inference algorithmswill not be exactly
the quantity required, but rather a value subsuming it.
Since the basic arithmetic operations for fuzzy numbers have a greater algo¬
rithmic complexity than their classical equivalents, inference techniques for
linguistic Bayesian networks are (weakly) less efficient than their classical coun¬
terparts. However, following the observations in Section 2.2.8, depending on
the representation used this will be a linear relationship.
(5.13)
xeDx
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Figure 5.1: The structure of the Water Sprinkler example Bayesian Network
5.4 A simple example
Russel and Norvig (1995) describe a BayesianNetwork that has become a stan¬
dard didactic example. Although very simple, this network can be used to
illustrate the key features of the technique such as conditional independence
and "explaining away". The network and associated probabilities describe an
analysis of the situation found, say, on a golf course in which three causal fac¬
tors (the general weather conditions, the weather and a sprinkler) collectively
determine whether the grass is wet. The network is formally specified by Fig¬
ure 5.1 and Tables 5.1 to 5.4.
One classic application of Bayesian Networks is diagnosis, that is the inference
of causes from effects. The sprinkler asserts that there are two (and only two)
possible immediate causes for the grass being wet - either it's raining or the




Table 5.1: The prior probability of cloudiness
c p(s = on | c) oIIOo
cloudy 0.1 0.9
sunny 0.5 0.5
Table 5.2: The conditional probability of the sprinkler being on
c p(r = raining \ c) p(r = clear \ c)
cloudy 0.8 0.2
sunny 0.2 0.8
Table 5.3: The conditional probability of rain
s r ScT II P(g = dry \ s,r)
off clear 0.0 1.0
raining 0.9 0.1
on clear 0.9 0.1
raining 0.99 0.01
Table 5.4: The conditional probability of the grass being wet
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Figure 5.2: The linguistic probability "Even chance'
sprinkler is on. So, given that the grass is wet, which of these causes is most
likely may be determined by computing the posterior probabilities as follows,
Thus if the grass is wet, rain is the most likely explanation.
Although this risks targetting a straw man, it seems clear that the probabilities
utilised in even this very simple example would be difficult to obtain experi¬
mentally. Instead they are the product of (perhaps informed) guesswork. It is
interesting therefore to examine how sensitive the conclusion drawn is to these
premises.
Using the probabilities shown in Figures 5.2 to 5.12, Tables 5.5, 5.7, 5.6, 5.8
provide a complete specification of a linguistic Bayesian network. Since these
p(r = raining \ g = wet)
p(.s = on | g = wet)
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Around 0.1
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Figure 5.3: The linguistic probability "Around 0.1"
Around 0.2
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Figure 5.4: The linguistic probability "Around 0.2"
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Figure 5.5: The linguistic probability "Around 0.8"
Around 0.9
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Figure 5.6: The linguistic probability "Around 0.9"







0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Probability








0 0.2 0.4 0.6
Probability
0.8
Figure 5.8: The linguistic probability "Impossible"
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Figure 5.10: The linguistic probability "Nearly impossible"
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Probability
Figure 5.11: The linguistic probability "Very likely"
Probability
Figure 5.12: The linguistic probability "Very unlikely"




Table 5.5: The prior probability of cloudiness
c p(s = on c) p(s = off c)
cloudy
sunny
around 0.1 around 0.9
even chance even chance
Table 5.6: The conditional probability of the sprinkler being on
c p(r = raining | c) p(r = clear | c)
cloudy around 0.8 around 0.2
sunny around 0.2 around 0.8
Table 5.7: The conditional probability of rain
s r p(g = wet \ s, r) p(g = dry\s,r)
off clear impossible certain
raining very likely very unlikely
on clear very likely very unlikely
raining nearly certain nearly impossible
Table 5.8: The conditional probability of the grass being wet
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probabilities subsume the (crisp embeddings of) the classical probabilities in
the original example, the output of that example may be used as a sanity check
on any computations performed using this extended model.
5.5 Arbor: a linguistic Bayesian network tool
The various fuzzy numbers and probability tables needed to fully specify a
linguistic Bayesian network are laborious to represent on paper and even more
cumbersome to work with. To simplify this process and reduce the sources of
error, a graphical tool, Arbor, was created.
Arbor is an extensible tool for creating and editing graph structures and per¬
forming operations upon them that was written to provide a comfortable en¬
vironment for experimenting with linguistic Bayesian networks.
Graph types (their topological constraints, node annotations and associated ac¬
tions) are defined using a plugin architecture. It utilises a plugin architecture
for defining graph types. The use of the high-level, object-oriented program¬
ming language Python allows functionality to be abstracted at various levels
of granularity across the system and in a way that reflects the structure of the
underlying mathematics.
So, for example, directed acyclic graphs are simply a sub-class of a directed
graph type, adding an acyclicness constraint check. Similarly, the Linguistic
Bayesian network graph class directly inherits the (suitably abstracted) infer¬
ence algorithm from a Bayesian network superclass - with comments the lin¬
guistic Bayesian network graph type amounts to just 60 lines of code. Re-using
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functionality in this way helps to ensure robustness of the system as well as
significantly reducing implementation time.
The system also makes use of other advanced language features offered by
Python. Functional programming styles are exensively employed in the infer¬
ence algorithms to take advantage of lazy evaluation/implicit state and clo¬
sures. The native serialization provided by the pickle module is also used to
provide save and restore functionality across hetrogenous graph types with no
additional code.
Finally the system enforces a clean separation of core logic and presentation
through the MVC (model-view-controller) paradigm. This is a useful engi¬
neering strategy as it simplifies interactions between components, but also di¬
rectly enables batch-mode operation. This enhances the reusability of core al¬
gorithms and data-structures - so, for example, it would be relatively trivial to
embed a linguistic Bayesian networkmodel in a "headless" server application.
5.6 Example computations
With the data fed into Arbor, it is a point and click operation to set the "grass"
variable to "wet" and determine the posterior distributions for the sprinkler
and weather. These are displayed in Figures 5.14 and 5.15 respectively.
As in the classical case (and as expected) if the grass is wet then rain is the most
likely explanation.
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Figure 5.13: A screenshot of the ARBORextensible Bayesian network editor showing
the network used in the forensics case study.
Chapter 5. Linguistic Bayesian Networks 89
Probability
Figure 5.14: The computed linguistic probability of the sprinkler being on given that the
grass is wet.
Probability
Figure 5.15: The computed linguistic probability of its raining given that the grass is wet.
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5.7 Summary
90
This chapter applied the theory of linguistic probabilities developed in Chap¬
ter 4 to the construction of graphical probabilistic models analogous to Pearl's
Bayesian networks. It was shown that a graphical model under a certain set of
constraints could be used to represent linguistic joint probability distributions
but that it is not clear whether all linguistic joint probability distributions are
representable in this way.
It was then shown that the underlying algebraic properties of the model allow
the use of standard, efficient belief propagation and relevance determination
algorithms. Finally, a standard didactic example of a Bayesian network was
extended to a sample linguistic Bayesian network. Sample computations per¬
formed with the aid of the Arbor software yielded results consist with, but
extending the classical case.
The following chapter will utilise this theory in connection with a contempo¬
rary application of Bayesian networks in forensic science.
Chapter 6
Case study: forensic statistics
Forensic statistics is a discipline that is mainly concerned with the experimen¬
tal design of forensic examinations and the analysis of the obtained results. The
issues it studies include hypothesis formulation, deciding on minimal sample
sizes when studying populations of similar units of evidence and determining
the statistical significance of the outcome of tests. Recently, the discipline has
been branching out to the study of the statistical implications of forensic exam¬
inations on defence and prosecution positions during crime investigation and
criminal court proceedings.
This chapter explains one application of classical Bayesian networks to forensic
statistics, namely the evaluation of the strength of support collected evidence
provides for a given crime scenario. An example is provided of such a network
and the calculations dictated by the protocol are performed. These results are
then contrasted with those obtained by using a similar, but more expressive
model utilizing linguistic probabilities.
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The material presented here was developed in conjunction with Jeroen Kep-
pens (then a researcher at the Joseph Bell Centre for Legal reasoning) and pre¬
sented to a an audience of specialists (Halliwell et al., 2003) in 2003.
6.1 Bayesian networks in forensic statistics
The most high-profile forensic application of Bayesian reasoning was in the
1996 case of Crown versus Denis John Adams. Here a statistical expert wit¬
ness explained Bayes' theorem to a jury and invited them to use it as a basis
for assessing a moderately complex set of evidence. Although the jury deliv¬
ered a guilty verdict, the case was appealed on the grounds that no alternative
method was provided for jurors who chose not to accept the mathematical
approach. Ultimately, the Court of Appeal upheld the conviction and gave
their opinion that "To introduce Bayes' Theorem, or any similar method, into
a criminal trial plunges the Jury into inappropriate and unnecessary realms of
theory and complexity, deflecting them from their proper task." Further appeal
was precluded, but the form of the ruling has ensured that the use of explicit
Bayesian assessment in the courtroom remains controversial.
Nevertheless, Bayesian reasoning has firmly established itselfwithin the crown
prosecution service. In Cook et al. (1998b), a method is proposed to assess the
impact of a certain piece of forensic evidence on a given case. This method is
the result of a significant research effort by the Forensic Science Service (FSS),
the largest provider of forensic science services in England and Wales. It in¬
volves 1) formalising the respective claims of the prosecution and the defence
Cook et al. (1998a); Evett et al. (2000), 2) computing the probability that the
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evidence is found given that the claim of the prosecution is true and the prob¬
ability that the evidence is found given that the claim of the defence is true,
and 3) dividing the former probability by the latter to determine the likelihood
ratio Balding and Donnelly (1995):
P(£ | Cd)
where E, Cp, Q respectively represent the evidence, the prosecution claim and
the defence claim, and P(£ | C) is the probability that evidence E is found if
claim C is true.
The likelihood ratio is a numerical evaluation of the extent to which the evi¬
dence supports the prosecution claim over the defence claim. It has two im¬
portant applications. Firstly, the potential benefit associated with performing
forensic procedures (which are often expensive and resource intensive) may be
assessed in advance by examining the effect of their possible outcomes on the
likelihood ratio. Increasingly, police forces must purchase forensic services.
Likelihood ratio based calculations can support this difficult decision making
process. Secondly, the likelihood ratio can be used to justify the testimonies
of forensic experts during the court proceedings. To this end, a verbal scale to
help forensic experts interpret the LR is suggested by the FSS Evett et al. (2000).
This is reproduced in Table 6.1 for reference.
6.1.1 Bayesian networks and likelihood ratio
The likelihood ratio method is, of course, crucially dependent upon a means
to compute the probabilities P(E \ Cp) and P(E \ Cd). Bayesian networks have
Chapter 6. Case study: forensic statistics 94
LR Support of evidence to prosecution claim over defence claim
1 to 10 limited
10 to 100 moderate
100 to 1,000 moderately strong
1,000 to 10,000 strong
> 10,000 very strong
Table 6.1: Interpretation of the likelihood ratio.
Event Domain
% quantity of transferred fragments {none,few,many}
r}p quantity of persisted fragments {none,few,many}
qi quantity of lifted fragments {none,few,many }
tc type of contact {none,some}
Ps proportion of fragments shed {none,small,large}
Pi proportion of fragments lifted {some,most,all}
Table 6.2: Variables in the one-way transfer case.
emerged as a helpful technique in this context Aitken et al. (2003); Cook et al.
(1999); Dawid et al. (2002).
A Bayesian network is a directed graph whose nodes represent events. Causal
relationships between these events are, in turn, represented by arcs. Since
the network is patterned after these real world relations, the decision to use
a Bayesian network can guide the knowledge acquisition process.
An example may best illustrate this application of Bayesian networks. Con-
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Figure 6.1: Bayesian network of a one-way transfer case,
sider the following scenario:
A burglar smashes the window of a shop, steals some money from the cash
registry and flees the scene of the crime. A bystander witnessed this event and
reports a description of the perpetrator to the police who arrest a man, match¬
ing the description of the witness half an hour after the event. The suspect,
Mr. Blue, denies having been near the shop. However, qi glass fragments,
matching the type of glass of the shop's window, are retrieved from Mr. Blue's
clothes.
Figure 6.1 shows a Bayesian network that models the probabilistic relation¬
ship between the retrieval of qi glass fragments from the garment of Mr. Blue
in the forensic laboratory and the type of contact, tc, between Mr. Blue and
the shop's window. The number of glass fragments qi that are retrieved from
Mr. Blue's clothes depends on the number of glass fragments that have per¬
sisted in the clothes qp and on the effectiveness of the retrieval technique pi,
where pi represents the proportion of glass fragments lifted from the garments
under examination. The number of glass fragments qp that have persisted in
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the clothes until the time of the examination, in turn, is dependent upon the
number of glass fragments qt that were transferred in the first place and the
proportion of fragments ps shed between the time of transfer and the time of
the examination. Finally, the number of transferred fragments qt depends on
the type of contact tc. The domains of these variables are reproduced in Table
6.2.
By Bayes' Theorem the joint distribution of variables involved in a Bayesian
network is given by the product of the (conditional or prior) distributions at
each node. Hence, P(qi IT tc) may be found by marginalizing over the other
variables:
P(qi n tc) = I P(P')
Pi,qp,qt,ps
P(qp I qt,ps)P(ps)Hit I *c)P(*c)




| tc)^2P(qp I qt,Ps)P(ps)
qt Ps
Suppose that the prosecution case is that the defendant has had some contact
with the window in question and that a given forensic procedure has yielded
manymatching fragments. The probabilities required to evaluate the likelihood
ratio are provided in Tables 6.3, 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6. The relevant calculation is,
LR
P (qi = many tc = some)
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Ps V(Ps) Pi P (Pi)
none 0.03 none 0.06
small 0.3 few 0.29
large 0.67 many 0.65
Table 6.3: Classical prior probabilities p(ps) and p(pi).
tc p(qt = none \ tc) p(qt = few \ tc) p(qt = many \ tc)
none 0.9 0.05 0.05
some 0.1 0.25 0.65
Table 6.4: Classical conditional probabilities p(qt | tc).
Qt Ps p(qp = none \ qt,ps) V(qP =few | qt,ps) p(qp = many \ qt,ps)
none none 1 0 0
small 1 0 0
large 1 0 0
few none 0 1 0
small 0.1 0.9 0
large 0.3 0.7 0
many none 0 0 1
small 0.05 0.1 0.85
large 0.07 0.48 0.45
Table 6.5: Classical conditional probabilities P(qp \ qtiPs)-
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Qp Pi LP (<?/ = none \qp,pi) LP)qi= few | qP,Pi) LP(g/ = many \ qp,pi)
none some 1 0 0
most 1 0 0
all 1 0 0
few some 0.05 0.95 0
most 0.05 0.95 0
all 0.02 0.6 0.38
many some 0.08 0.46 0.46
most 0.2 0.2 0.6
all 0 0 1
Table 6.6: Classical conditional probabilities p(<?/ | qp,pi).
Thus, according to Table 1, this item of forensic evidence provides moderate
support to the prosecution case.
6.2 Linguistic Bayesian networks for forensic statistics
This section details a proof-of-concept case study created in conjunction with
Jeroen Keppens (at the time a researcher at the Joseph Bell Centre for Legal
reasoning). This study together with a sketch of the underlying theory was
presented to an audience of specialists in the area of legal applications of arti¬
ficial intelligence techniques at ICAIL03.
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Figure 6.3: The linguistic probability labelled "Nearly impossible"
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Figure 6.5: The linguistic probability labelled "Quite unlikely"
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Figure 6.7: The linguistic probability labelled "Quite likely"
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Figure 6.9: The linguistic probability labelled "Nearly certain"







Figure 6.10: The linguistic probability labelled "Certain"
Table 6.7: Linguistic prior probabilities lp(ps) and lp(p/)
Ps lp (Ps) Pi lp {pi)
none nearly impossible none nearly impossible
small quite unlikely few quite unlikely
large quite likely many quite likely
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Table 6.8: Linguistic conditional probabilities lp{qt \ tc).
tc 'P{qt — none | tc) ip {qt = few | tc) lp (qt = many \ tc)
none nearly certain nearly impossible nearly impossible
some impossible quite unlikely quite likely
Table 6.9: Linguistic conditional probabilities lp(gp | qt,Ps)-
qt Ps lp(qp = none \qt,ps) lp(qP = few | qt,Ps) lp(qp = many \ qt,ps)
none none certain impossible impossible
small certain impossible impossible
large certain impossible impossible
few none impossible certain impossible
small very unlikely very likely impossible
large quite unlikely quite likely impossible
many none impossible impossible certain
small nearly impossible very unlikely very likely
large nearly impossible even chance even chance
6.2.1 Extended example: Glass transfer
Tables 6.7, 6.8, 6.9 and 6.10 present a linguistically specified version of the net¬
work discussed in Section 2. The qualitative probability terms themselves are
in turn graphed in Figures 6.2 to 6.10. Computations are performed in exactly
the same sequence as in the classical case, but with fuzzy arithmetic opera¬
tors and numbers. This yields fuzzy values for lp(qi = many \ tc = some),\p(qi =
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Table 6.10: Linguistic conditional probabilities lp(qi \ qp,pi).
qP Pi lp (qi=none \qp,pi) lp{qi= few | qp,pi) lp{qi-many \ qp,pt)
none some certain impossible impossible
most certain impossible impossible
all certain impossible impossible
few some nearly impossible nearly certain impossible
most nearly impossible nearly certain impossible
all nearly impossible very likely very unlikely
many some nearly impossible even chance even chance
most very unlikely very unlikely quite likely
all impossible impossible certain
many \ tc = none) and the likelihood ratio. These are presented in Figures 6.11
and 6.13 respectively. Note that the membership functions, as expected, sub¬
sume their classical counterparts as calculated in Section 2.
The value calculated for lp (qi = many \ tc — none) is particularly interesting.
Practical forensic applications typically use conservative (high) estimates for
P(£|Q) (i.e. the denominator in the likelihood calculation) thereby biasing the
case in favour of the defence (Cook et al., 1999). Additionally, the probabili¬
ties typically associated with the subsets of events modelling the case where
evidence originates not with the crime, but with some other source, are van-
ishingly small. Moreover, these probabilities are typically the most difficult
to obtain experimentally. The use of linguistic probabilities to represent such
probabilities allows the uncertainty that prompts this conservatism to be ex¬
plicitly included in the model.
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The fuzzy value calculated for the likelihood ratio has an extremely broad
plateau (oc-cut at 1), dramatically exhibiting the sensitivity of this statistic to
small perturbations in the subjective probabilities on which it is based. That
the set's membership function is greater than zero in each of the Forensic Sci¬
ence Service's recommended interpretation classes that are reproduced in Ta¬
ble 1 is, of course, partly a result of the rather "low-resolution" term set used
for convenience of presentation here. Nevertheless, to re-iterate the central ar¬
gument of this paper, the effects of propagating uncertainties should not be
brushed aside. It is clear from the graph that the support provided by the evi¬
dence is roughly speaking moderate to strong. Note that, given a fuzzification
of the likelihood ratio quantity space, it would be possible to automatically
generate this description. However, the newly acknowledged uncertainties in
the subjective probability estimates are certainly consistent with much more
limited support.
6.3 Summary
This chapter illustrated how linguistic Bayesian networks might be used in
a real-world setting. Classical Bayesian networks are already utilised by the
UK's Forensic Science Service to calculate the evidential support for a given
criminal scenario. However, some of the prior and conditional probabilities
involved in these models are obtained "subjectively" through expert consulta¬
tion. This is then an ideal application for linguistic probabilities.
The increased expressivity of linguistic probabilities allows second order un¬
certainty to be represented intuitively as is surely appropriate where probabil-
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Figure 6.12: The computed iingustic probability of lp(<?/ = many \ tc — none).
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Figure 6.13: The computed fuzzy likelihood ratio plotted on a logarithmic scale.
ities cannot be determined experimentally for practical or economic reasons.
That the likelihood ratio calculated above spans the entire range considered
by FSS protocols suggests that the greater expressivity provided by linguistic
probabilities would have important consequences for decision making within
criminal prosecutions. Although the probabilistic relationship between factors
in the scenario considered is not sufficiently determinate to allow a definitive




This chapter begins with a recapitulation of the major results presented in the
foregoing text. This is followed by a discussion of some of the limitations of
the present work together with some suggestions as to how these might be
addressed in future.
7.1 Summary
Chapter 1 was primarily concerned with establishing the context and motiva¬
tion for this work. A number of studies were cited each suggesting that fuzzy
numbers might be a more suitable representation for subjective probability es¬
timates than classical point probabilities. Taking this as read, the central re¬
search question was stated: what form should a theory of fuzzy probabilities
take?
Chapter 2 sought to establish the philosophical and technical background un-
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derlying the work as a whole. Although most of the material there is well es¬
tablished, some of the observations about fuzzy numbers and arithmetic have
not been widely recognised. Furthermore some notational conventions, es¬
pecially those concerned with alphacuts, fuzzy numbers and fuzzy intervals
which have not yet found wide acceptance were introduced for the sake of
clarity.
Building on this foundation Chapter 3 presented a brisk summary of previous
work on hybridizing probability theory and fuzzy logic. There have been a
reasonable number of assays in this general direction most of which have been
rather tentative or positional in character. In the context of the present work
Chapter 3's principle contribution was to introduce and distinguish between
the two most widely cited attempts to provide a theory of "fuzzy probabili¬
ties". It was shown that, though intuitively appealing both Zadeh and Jain
and Agogino's theories exhibit serious technical problems that render them
incapable of expressing non-trivial fuzzy probability measures.
In response to these criticisms, Chapter 4 developed the core contribution of
this thesis - the theory of linguistic probabilities. Unlike the somewhat ad
hoc approach taken by earlier researchers, linguistic probability theory was
explicitly patterned after the standard measure-theoretic axioms of contempo¬
rary probability theory. It was shown that linguistic probability measures, like
their classical counterparts, are monotonic and continuous. Analogues for the
classical concepts of conditional probability, independence and discrete and
continuous random variables were introduced and discussed.
Chapter 5 developed the theory into a computational application by show-
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ing how linguistic probabilities might be used in conjunction with a Bayesian-
network-like graphical knowledge representation. Itwas shown that the repre¬
sentational scheme is consistent in the sense that networks with an identified
set of properties do indeed represent joint linguistic probability mass func¬
tions. The issue of representational completeness was also examined and it
was shown that the classical constructive proof strategy is invalid in this con¬
text.
In order to illustrate how such linguistic Bayesian networks might be used,
Chapter 6 introduced the application area of forensic statistics and presented
a simple case-study contrasting the fuzzy and the classical approaches. Whilst
tentative, the results of this comparison indicate the potential significance of
adopting the proposed representational scheme as small second-order uncer¬
tainties in prior and conditional probability estimates can have an extremely
significant effect on established decision making protocols.
7.2 Discussion
The core theory of linguistic probabilities developed in Chapter 4 provides
a much more robust foundation for further investigation of "fuzzy probabil¬
ities". The relative ease with which sophisticated concepts such as random
variables and expectation were developed illustrates the advantages of adopt¬
ing a principled, measure-theoretic approach over the earlier statistical (Zadeh,
1984) and mass-function-based (Jain and Agogino, 1990) analyses.
Furthermore, the demonstration that linguistic probabilities may be used to
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construct graphical knowledge representations shows that this is not merely
a dry, mathematical theory, but a practical calculus capable of efficient imple¬
mentation.
Finally, the utility of the approach as whole has not been demonstrated here
(although studies such as Budescu and Wallsten (1985) lend strong support)
however the case-study in forensic statistics was well-received by an expert
audience.
7.3 Future work
Nevertheless, the present work has only scratched the surface of each of these
three aspects. The following sections examine some of these limitations and
sketches a programme of work that might lead to a fuller picture.
7.3.1 Interpretation
Hitherto the interpretation of linguistic probabilities - what they mean - has
been treated as unproblematic. The intent has been to suggest a subjectivist
approach consistent with the predominant understanding of classical proba¬
bility theory. However it is possible to see the beginnings of connections with
alternative semantics.
One extremely natural approach is to align linguistic probabilities with second-
order classical probabilities. For the purposes of easy exposition, suppose that
A and B are disjoint events (so A (IB = 0) such as a die roll's resulting in a 1
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Figure 7.1: A graph of the density distribution of pa¬
ck 6 respectively. Suppose further that since the probabilities are not known
precisely but are instead given by random variables, pa and pp.
This model is a very simple second-order probability distribution i.e. we have
probability density functions, fPA and fPB. Ontologically this is usually thought
of as correspondingwith a probability distribution over all possible probability
distributions with respect to some (fixed) sigma algebra. Consider the uniform
case where pa and pp are evenly distributed between ci\ and a.2, and b\ and b2
respectively. For notational convenience define,
a = ci2 — a\ and b = b2 — b\ (7.1)
Then we have the second-order density functions,
1 if * G [a\, a2]




In order to picture ofwhat the various functions involved in the following look
like it is necessary to plug in a set of values. Although what follows is perfectly
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general the visualisations will use a\ = 0.1, ai = 0.3, b\ =0.1 and £>2 = 0.5. This
density function is graphed in Figure 7.1.
Now consider the confidence intervals this generates. First the expected value
of pa may be calculated as
f 1 rCl2 ^ 1 £
mA = E(pA) = / xfPA(x)dx= -dx=——- (7.2)
Jo Jai a z
Next, consider regions either side of this mean. Given 0 < 8 < a2~al,




This equation may be solved to determine the function dA such that
P(pa G [mA - 5a (a), mA + 8a (a)]) = 1 - a (7.4)
This may be calculated as
§A(oc) = a(1 a) (7.5)
A similar calculation can be made for C = A U B. Since A and B are exclusive
events we know that the probability of C is just the sum of their probabilities
i.e. pc = Pa + Pb-
Now assuming that the second-order priors are independent, that <32 + ^2 < b
and without loss of generality that that a < b (if not then we can "swap" A and
B. This final condition introduces an element of asymmetry which will persist
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through the following calculations that would otherwise be surprising. This
immediately implies that <22 + ^1 < a\ + &2-
It is then possible to derive the following expression for the convolution,
fc{x) = [ fPA,PB(t,x-t)dtJo
= < «2~ai
ab
0 x < a\ +b\
x ^ bl ai + b\ < x < a.2 +b\
a,2+b\ < x < a\+b2 (7-6)
ai+^2<JC<a2 + ^2
0 «2 + b2 < X
As a sanity check one can verify that this is indeed a density function (i.e.
fa fc{x)dx = 1). It is graphed in Figure 7.2. Now it is possible to calculate
the expected value and confidence intervals. By symmetry (or calculation)
mc = E(pc) =m.A + mB as expected.
Now the confidence interval equation for pc can be computed as,
P(pc e [mc - 5,mc + 5])
25
b if 0 < 5 <^
5(a+2>-5)-i(6-a)2 .c b_a ^ x ^ a+b
ab 11 2 ^ 0 — 2
1 otherwise
(7.7)
It then remains to analyse the relationship between 8 and a i.e. find the func¬
tion 8c such that
P(Pc € [mc — 8c(oc),mc+ 5c(oc)]) = 1 — a
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a\ + b2 -
b2 ......
a2 + b\ __
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a i a2
Figure 7.2: Diagram of the joint distribution fPA,PB showing the various regions used in
the case analysis of its density function and confidence intervals.
This can be calculated as,
Sc(a) =
b{\—a)
2 if a > |
— y/aab otherwise
(7.8)
The delta function "predicted" by linguistic probability theory is (1 -«Xa+fr) _
It is relatively straightforward to show that this dominates 8c- The (slightly)
difficult case is where a < |. Note that,




since a < £
since a < b
a(a+'') <
2
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Figure 7.3: The computed confidence intervals for the second-order probability pc and
the corresponding linguistic probability.
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and so,
(1 — o)(a + b) a + b
— VcLab = 8c(«)2
as required.
So for this rather simple example, linguistic probabilities seem at least con¬
sistent with an interpretation based on second-order probabilities and their
confidence intervals. The general case has, however, proven less amenable to
this style of analysis. But that a proof has not yet been found, does not entail
no proof exists. The general idea of linguistic probabilities as an an indepen¬
dence agnostic approach to using second-order models remains an attractive
goal and interesting prospect for future research.
Another line of investigation that was inconclusively pursued as a possible
basis for the interpretation of linguistic probabilities was their connection with
rough-sets. Rough set theory is an extension of classical set theory that takes as
its "atoms" pairs of classical sets, representing, so to speak, amost conservative
and most liberal estimate of a concept's extension given a quantised reference
space.
The intuition behind this connection is that event spaces may be thought of as
just such a quantisation. Now given a probability measure (Q, £,P) rough set
theory gives us a very natural means of representing the probability of a set, A
of outcomes that is not in the set of events. So the lower approximation would
be
sup{P(£) : EeEAECA} (7.9)
and the upper
inf{P(£) : E e EAA C £} (7.10)
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So rough-sets naturally generate interval-valued probabilities, but how might
this link with fuzzy-valued probabilities? One natural possibility would be to
examine a mapping from alpha values to sub-algebras of a given event space.
In principle such a mapping seems, formally at least, consistent with the calcu¬
lus of linguistic probabilities. However, fuzzy truth values are not obviously
aligned with differing resolutions, so this approach might raisemore questions
than it promises to answer.
7.3.2 Evaluation as a method for knowledge engineering
Although the idea of using linguistic probabilities to capture expert knowl¬
edge has been strongly endorsed by the studies cited in Chapter 1, it would
be helpful to examine to what extent linguistic Bayesian networks are a useful
technique in this area.
Ideally one would collect two groups of experts in a particular domain and
invite them to create networks modelling a particular scenario. One group
would utilise conventional Bayesian networks and the other a linguistic sys¬
tem. In order to reduce the scope of the experiment and facilitate interpretation
of the results, the topology might be fixed in advance.
It would then be possible to examine quantitative properties of the knowledge
elicitation process, such as how long it took. This is often used to evaluate such
processes (Menzies and van Harmelen, 1999).
In evaluating the resulting models themselves, several metrics might be con¬
sidered. First, since they generalise the classical case any use of the additional
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expressivity allowed by linguistic Bayesian networks could be construed as
immediate confirmation that this expressivity is welcome.
Next, it would be interesting to contrast the output of the models with histor¬
ical decisions. This would require a corpus of internal FSS records discussing
cases that fit the pre-agreed modelling scenario. However, the finding an ap¬
propriate scenario and adequately addressing the ethical and legal issues sur¬
rounding the creation and utilisation of such a corpus would require substan¬
tial effort.
Obviously the use of different design tools would further complicate the eval¬
uation of these results. Arbor's ability to edit both classical and linguistic
Bayesian networks would however substantially mitigate this.
Nevertheless, it remains difficult to quantitatively evaluate knowledge engi¬
neering techniques. Human factors, priming effects, and the absence of a "cor¬
rect" target output are amongst the many problems in creating a rigorous em¬
pirical study. For these reasons a qualitative approach would likely prove more
illuminating.
So, participants in the proposed study would be asked to fill out a question¬
naire enquiring about their experience of formalising their expert knowledge
using the two representational schemes. The questions would focus as much
as possible on their "comfort" with the resulting model, although the precise
framing would benefit from collaboration with an expert in human-computer
interaction.
Although much work remains to be done before linguistic Bayesian networks
can be broadly accepted as a knowledge engineering technique, the promise of
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vastly enhanced expressivity at an affordable computational cost should not be
ignored.
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